NDAA & Video Surveillance

NDAA & Video Surveillance

Closed-circuit television (CCTV), also known as video surveillance, is the use of video cameras to transmit a signal to a specific place, on a limited set of monitors. It differs from broadcast television in that the signal is not openly transmitted, though it may employ point-to-point (P2P), point-to-multipoint (P2MP), or mesh wired or wireless links but transmit a signal to a specific place only. Not for open to all. 

An early mechanical CCTV system was developed in June 1927 by Russian physicist Léon Theremin. Originally requested by the Soviet of Labour and Défense, the system consisted of a manually-operated scanning-transmitting camera and wireless shortwave transmitter and receiver, with a resolution of a hundred lines.

One of the first recorded application for closed circuit television system (CCTV) was back in 1942.  It was used to view the launch of V2 rockets in Germany.   In the US, commercial surveillance applications began around 1947.

The goal of this history is to help professionals newer to the industry understand the important business and technology shifts that impact the market today, including:

1950 - Colour cameras became available.

1957 – 1969: a number of companies such as General Precision Labs (GPL division), provided CCTV camera systems

1970 – 1999: Videocassette recorders (VCR) era.

2000 – 2005: DVR Era

2001 - 9/11 Impact

2006 - Infancy IP and VMS (Axis introduced the first IP cameras in 1996)

2008 – 2012: MP Cameras Go H.264, Main player are PELCO, Hanwha (Samsung), Axis, Infinova, Flir, Indigo Vision, AVTECH etc.

2009 – 2013: Cloud Hype / Bursts

2010 – 2018: Struggles for Video Analytics, WDR and Low Light Improvements

2012 – 2014: Rise and Fall of Edge Storage

2015 Smart CODECs Rise

2018 H.265 Mainstream

Storage No Longer Major Problem

Slowing of Camera Resolution Increases

HD Analog Rises 2014, Niche Now

Rise Cybersecurity 2015 - Current

2013 – 2017: Rise of The Chinese

2015 – 2017: Race to The Bottom

2018 - Now US vs China.

2019 - Rise AI and Cloud Startups

2020 - Coronavirus Impact - Elevated skin temperatures camera & globally reject China factory made product.

Source: IPVM

Day by Day increase hacking of video surveillance camera. Now cyberattacks on CCTV systems making news headlines on a weekly basis of late, there is a good deal of concern and uncertainty about how at risk these systems are, as well as why they are being attacked.

In 2014, a US ally observed a malicious actor attacking the US State Department computer systems. In response the NSA traced the attacker’s source and infiltrated their computer systems gaining access to their CCTV cameras from where they were able to observe the hackers’ comings and goings.

In October 2016, 600,000 internet connected cameras, DVR’s, routers and other IoT devices were compromised and used to for a massive Bot Net to launch what was the largest Denial of Service (DOS) attack the internet had experienced to date.

In the lead up to the 2017 US Presidential inauguration, 65% of the recording servers for the city of Washington CCTV system were infected with ransomware. How did the attack take place? Whilst unknown, it most likely occurred by the same means as other common PC hacks such as infected USB keys, malicious web sites, or phishing attacks.

May, 2018, over 60 Canon cameras in Japan were hacked with “I’m Hacked. bye2” appearing in the camera display text. How did the attack take place? Simple. IP cameras were connected to the internet and were left on default credentials. It appears that the hackers logged into the cameras and changed the on-screen display. What was the impact? Other the defacement of the camera displays and some reputational damage, there doesn’t seem to have been much impact from these attacks.

On Aug 13, 2018, The US President has signed the 2019 NDAA into law, banning the use of Dahua and HikVision (and their OEMs) for the US government, for US government-funded contracts and possibly for 'critical infrastructure' and 'national Security’ usage.

US government is effectively blacklisting Dahua and HikVision products, this will have a severe branding and consequentially purchasing impact. Many buyers will be concerned about:

What security risks those products pose for them

What problems might occur if they want to integrate with public / government systems

What future legislation at the state or local level might ban usage of such systems

On Jun 06, 2019 Hanwha Techwin is dropping Huawei Hisilicon from all of their products. Its belongs to China’s origin. Backdoor entry is open on product.

China's Wuhan Institute of Virology, the lab at the core of coronavirus. The institute is home to the China Centre for Virus Culture Collection, the largest virus bank in Asia which preserves more than 1,500 strains ( https://www.livemint.com/news/world/china-s-wuhan-institute-of-virology-the-lab-at-the-core-of-a-virus-controversy-11587266870143.html ). Result Corona has infected people in 185 countries. Its spread has left businesses around the world counting the costs. Global economy impact. Recession increase. Now people avoid to get china factory made product, electronics goods importing has stopped from china to other country. People looking for product except china. Now come to Video surveillance, access control equipment.

The ban that prohibits the purchase and installation of video surveillance equipment from Hikvision, Dahua and Hytera Communications in federal installations – passed on year 2018 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). In conjunction with the ban’s implementation, the government has also published a Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) that outlines interim rules for how it will be applied moving forward. Like NFPA, now NDAA law accept globally.

Rules outlined in this FAR include:

·        A “solicitation provision” that requires government contractors to declare whether a bid includes covered equipment under the act;

·        Defines covered equipment to include commercial items, including commercially available off-the-shelf (COTS) items, which the rule says, “may have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities;”

·        Requires government procurement officers to modify indefinite delivery contracts to include the FAR clause for future orders;

·        Extends the ban to contracts at or below both the Micro-Purchase Threshold ($10,000) and Simplified Acquisition Threshold ($250,000), which typically gives agencies the ability to make purchases without federal acquisition rules applying.

·        Prohibits the purchase and installation of equipment from Chinese telecom giants Huawei and ZTE Corporation. This would also presumably extend to Huawei subsidiary Hisilicon, whose chips are found in many network cameras;

·        And, gives executive agency heads the ability grant a one-time waiver on a case-by-case basis for up to a two-year period.

Specifically, NDAA Section 889 creates a general prohibition on telecommunications or video surveillance equipment or services produced or provided by the following companies (and associated subsidiaries or affiliates):

·        Huawei Technologies Company; or

·        ZTE Corporation

It also prohibits equipment or services used specifically for national security purposes, such as public safety or security of government facilities, provided by the following companies (and associated subsidiaries or affiliates):

·        Hytera Communications Corporation;

·        Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology Company; or

·        Dahua Technology Company

While the prohibitions are initially limited to the five named companies, Section 889 authorizes the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence or the Director of the FBI, to extend these restrictions to additional companies based on their relationships to the Chinese Government. The prohibitions will take effect for executive-branch agencies on August 13, 2019, one year after the date of the enactment of the 2019 NDAA, and will extend to beneficiaries of any grants, loans, or subsidies from such agencies after an additional year.

The provisions of Section 889 are quite broad, and key concepts are left undefined, such as how the Secretary of Defense is to determine what constitutes an entity that is “owned or controlled by, or otherwise connected to” a covered foreign country, or how the head of an agency should determine whether a component is “substantial,” “essential,” or “critical” to the system of which it is part. The statute also fails to address the application of the prohibitions to equipment produced by U.S. manufacturers that incorporate elements supplied by the covered entities as original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) or other kinds of supplier relationships.

Section 889 contains two exceptions under which its prohibitions do not apply:

(1) It allows Executive agencies to procure services that connect to the facilities of a third party, “such as backhaul, roaming, or interconnection arrangements.” This likely means telecommunications providers are permitted to maintain common network arrangements with the covered entities.

(2) It permits covered telecommunications equipment that is unable to “route or redirect user data traffic or permit visibility into any user data or packets” it might handle, meaning a contractor may still be able to provide services to the Government so long as any covered equipment provided is unable to interact or access the data it handles.

 

Update on 2018; IPVM Source

Hikvision is one of the world’s largest video surveillance companies producing both hardware and software tools. It is central to China’s ambitions to become the world’s leading supplier of surveillance systems. Hikvision sells cameras and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) allowing security agencies to monitor railway stations, roads, etc. It is a darling of the Communist Party of China (CPC), having been heralded as a ‘national AI Champion” in 2019.

As per a 2019 report, around 42 per cent of the company is controlled by state enterprises, with China Electronics Technology HIK Group owning nearly 40 per cent. Hikvision controlled 21 per cent of the world’s CCTV market in 2017.

Hikvision exists in India under the name Prama Hikvision Indian Private Limited. As per reports, Hikvision enjoys over 35 per cent market share in India. Its 2019 annual report said it has established a local factory in India — its first overseas production base. It is 58 per cent owned by the parent Chinese company. The Indian partner is Ashish P. Dhakan, who started the collaboration in 2005. It has declared serious investment plans for India.

In 2018, it won a tender from the Delhi government to install 1.5 lakh CCTV cameras in the national capital. It is also listed as a vendor by Bharat Electronics (BEL), which works on highly sensitive and classified defence projects for the government of India. More worryingly, Hikvision has allegedly also supplied solutions to Delhi Metro Rail Corporation (DMRC), Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), and the Special Protection Group (SPG), which is responsible for the security of the prime minister. Link https://www.indiatoday.in/mail-today/story/installation-of-1-4-lakh-chinese-cctv-cameras-by-delhi-govt-sparks-row-1696032-2020-07-02

Clearly, the security and privacy risks at play here are best left to one’s imagination.

This leaves India with a tricky situation. Admittedly such companies do create secondary economic benefits for India with the local assembly and selling units creating jobs at home. However, there is arguably a bigger price India pays in terms of handing its CCTV grid to a country that is in no mood to offer any concessions to us.

Update on 2018; IPVM Source

Update on 2018; IPVM Source

For starters, the Modi government needs to make a clear list or database of all its current installations. Second, it needs to review all installations that would be considered critical or with a national security implication, and then  seriously consider replacing them with a local alternative. If that is not feasible, the government needs to wrap such installations with third party (non-Chinese) encryption tools, which would disable any back doors that may exist. Third, India must prohibit Hikvision from participating in any ongoing or future government tenders. Fourth, the government needs to contemplate increasing local ownership and control of the Indian subsidiary. An innovative solution would be to purchase the 58 per cent stake in Hikvision — either the government could be an investor or it could be enabled by other Indian businesses or funds. Fifth, the Modi government needs to impose a legal obligation for regular audits to check for any security vulnerabilities with serious penalties for non-compliance or negligence.

Lastly, like the Chinese, India too needs to create local champions. In India, this is always the hardest part — less access to capital, poor procurement processes, etc. Most of the technology and subcomponents for Hikvision come from the United States. It is important to remind ourselves that with enough government support, India too can build local champions of technology. Link https://theprint.in/opinion/chinas-hikvision-controls-indias-surveillance-market-modi-needs-to-do-more-than-ban-apps/452014/

Often those on the government procurement side use price as an excuse to prefer Chinese over Indian vendors. But it’s a lazy argument. Yes, Chinese vendors and their products are often cheaper, but it is because they have worked on these things for decades. Cheap is also not always better and certainly not more secure.

As India considers the next steps, it is important to not penalise and demonise the Indian entrepreneur behind the local subsidiary. They are not to blame. It shouldn’t take a border stand-off and loss of lives for such issues to be tackled head-on.

Now question how we design a CCTV project respect to product selection. Many institutional purchaser want to stop such camouflaged OEM from their procurement activities. Yeah this is very hard to say this company are not tie-up with china-based company. As we are belonging to India, Atmanirbhar Bharat (self-reliant India) is the vision of the Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi of making India a self-reliant nation. The first mention of this came in the form of the 'Atmanirbhar Bharat Abhiyan' or 'Self-Reliant India Mission' during the announcement of the coronavirus pandemic related economic package on 12 May 2020. Known china CCTV OEM are thrown out. Yes, it’s true, India don’t have much infrastructure to generate Camera manufacturing plant, it will take time at list 5 year. Within this time, we can follow BIS website to get information about selected camera / NVR model are china factory make or not. Low cost and high cost both option camera you can found. If you found that model belongs to china factory immediately change with Closest or Alternative Substitute.

Another way to design selection your camera / storage via NDAA compliance. For example, few models of Pelco, Axis, LILIN, Honeywell get NDAA compliance. Some OEM giving good effort, based on Hikvision or Dahua camera which is current compatible camera. Example:

Dahua Model: IPC-HFW8630E-ZE is Closest to Pelco model: IBP521-1R & Alternative Substitute is IBP521-1R.

Dahua Model: SD10A248V-HNI is Closest to Pelco model: P2230-ESR & Alternative Substitute is S6230-EGL1.

Hikvision Model: DS-2CD4025FWD-AP is Closest to Pelco model: IXE22 or IXE32.

Hikvision Model: DS-2CD2125FWD-I 4MM is Closest to Pelco model: IMP221-1RS Or IWP221-1ES/IJP223-1RS.
Yes PELCO is 1st OEM who get NDAA & share compatible camera with respect HikVision & dahua model number.

NDAA Compliance Product List.

Brands	Dome Camera	Bullet Camera	180° / Panoramic Cameras	360° Cameras / PTZ	NVR	Video Server
VIVOTEK	CD8371-HNTV, CD8371-HNVF2, MD8531H, MD8563-DEH, IT9360-H, IT9380-H, IT9388-HT FD816CA-HF2, FD8166A, FD8166A-N, FD8177-HT, FD8366-V, FD8377-EHTV, FD8377-HTV, FD9165-HT-A	IB8377-EHT,  IB8377-HT, IB9360-H, IB9365-EHT-A, IB9365-HT-A, IB9368-HT, IB9380-H, IB9387-EHT-A, IB9387-HT-A, IB9388-HT, IP9164-HT, IP9164-LPC	CC8160, CC8370-HV, CC9381-HV	FE8182, FE9380-EHV	NR9581, NR9581-v2, NR9681, NR9681-v2, NR9682, NR9682-v2, NR9782 , NR9782-v2, NS9521	VS8100-v2
Honeywell	HC60W35R2, HC60W35R4, HC60W45R2, HC30W42R3, HC30W45R3,	HC60WB5R2, HC60WB5R5, HC30WB2R1, HC30WB5R1, HC30WB5R2	HC30WF5R1	HC60WZ2E30,	HN30080200, HN30160200, HNMXE08C02T, HNMXE16C02T, HNMSE16C02T, HNMSE32C02T, HNMSE48C04T, HNMPE32C16T4R5	HERN30T5, HERN40T5, HERN64T8, HERN72T12, HERN96T16, HERN128T16, HERN144T24, HERN192T24
PELCO	MP221-1RS, IWP221-1ES, IJP222-1RS, IMP221-1RS, IWP221-1ES, IMP321-1RS, IMP521-1RS, IBP221-1R, IMP521-1RS, IBP321-1R, IBP521-1R,	IBE222-1R, IBE322-1R, IBE229-1R, IBE329-1R, IME329-1ES, IMP321-1ES, IBP522-1R, IME229-1ES, IMP221-1ES, IBP521-1R, IBP221-1R, IBE329-1R, IBP221-1R	EVO-12NMD, EVO-05LID, EVO-05LMD, EVO-05LID, EVO-05LMD, EVO-180-WED-P, IMM12018-1EP, EVO-05NMD.	IMP521-1RS, IME329-1IS, IWP221-1ES, IME322-1ES, IME229-1ES, MP122-1ES, IMP221-1ES, S6230-FWL1, P1220-FWH1, S6230-EGL1, P1220-ESR1, S6230-EGL1, P2230-ESR,
AV Costar	AV5456PMIR-S, AV02CLD-100, AV05CLD-100, AV5456PMIR-S	AV5426PMIR-S, AV02CLB-100, AV05CLB-100, AV5426PMIR-S, AV02CMB-100, AV05CMB-100	AV12CPD-236, AV08CPD-118, AV20CPD-118	AV8476DN-NL, AV8476DN-28, AV20476DN-NL, AV20476RS, AV20476DN-28, AV8476DN-NL, AV8476RS,  AV20476DN-NL	AV-CN1600-20T, AV-CN800-8T, AV-CN1600-8T, AV-CN1600-6T, AV-CN1600-12T, AV-CSCX40TR, AV-CSHPX12TR,
IDIS	DC-D4236RX DC-D4236X DC-D4236HRX DC-D4236WRX DC-D4216RX DC-D4216X DC-D4216WRX	DC-T4236HRX DC-T4236WRX DC-E4216WRX			IR-100 IR-300A IR-1100
AcTi	Z94, Z95, Z83	Z33, Z34, Z41
LILIN	P3R6322E2, P3R6522E2, Z3R6522X, Z3R6422X3, P5R6322E2, P5R6552E2, Z5R6452X, P5R6522E2	Z2R8122X-P, Z2R8022EX25, Z2R8822AX, Z2R8152X-P, Z5R8952X3, Z5R8922X3, P2R8852E2, P2R8822E4, P3R8822E2	F2R3682IM, F2R36C2IM	PSR5520EX25, PSR5024EX30, IPS4184E, PSD4624EX20, IPS5180E, IPS4204EA, IPS5208A, IPS5308A, IPS5200EA, IPS5300EA	NVR3416R, NVR100L, NVR1400, NVR3416, NVR5416E, NVR5832S, NVR5104E, NVR5208E	NVR404C, VS212, VD022
3s Vision	N9071M-BE, N9079-BE, N9049-BE, N9099-BE, N9019-B, N3031-C, N9072-A	N6091-BE, N6041-BE, N6071-BE, N601A-EL, N6012-C		N5012H-BE, N5049-BE,	R40244-B, R10124-B, R10064-B, F20321, H40321, IB1281	S8072-B, SG072-B, S4072-B

For SOHO industry or small medium company, do start with making video data policy, its very important, due to using Chinese owned product every country data is now with hacker. Basically, china product is low price due to no standard quality. Other country like Taiwan or Korea product not low price, due to they maintain minimum quality of product. Now time to change, due to corona virus people change lifestyle. Indian govt need to general prohibition on telecommunications or video surveillance equipment or services produced. 

Below I share some Indian factory-made product model based on Brand. BIS not necessarily certify the quality and source of components. Very important for customers to understand.

Brand Name	BIS approved Model Number	Factory Located
INFINOVA	VS220-A60B-A022,VS220-A60B-A062,VT240-A222-A3,VS221-A20B-B022,VS210-P2	Pune, Maharashtra, India
	VT-231-A230-C061, VT231-A230-A061, VT231-A230-A061, VH121-A20E-A022-32G,
	VT221-A20B-B022, VT221-A20B-U062, VT220-A20B-S022, VH221-A40B-A022,
	VS220-A20BB062,VS220-A20B-C022,VS220-A20B-C062, VT230-A230-D061,
	VT231-B230-D061,VS211-A20B-D0,VS211-A20E-C0,VS211-A20E-D0,VS211-A60B-A0
	VH221-B402-A012, VH221-B403-A012, VH221-B406-A012, VH221-B408-A012
	VH221-B412-A012,VH211-B402, VH211-B403-A0, VH211-B406-A0, VH211-B408-A0,
	V3073-08J02; V3073-16J02; V3073-24J02; V3073-64J16; V3073-128J16
Honeywell	HEICC-2301T; HEIPTZ-2201W-IR; HABC-2305PIV; HADC-2005PI	Gurgaon Haryana, India
WBOX TECHNOLOGIES	0E-CVHD5R2FPNA28; 0E-CVHD5R2FPNA6; 0E-CVHB2R2FPNA6	Noida, Uttar pradesh, India
D-LINK	DCS-F3611-L1, DCS-F3711-L1, DCS-F3711-L1P	Haridwar, Uttarakhand, India
TENTRONIX	TI-QX4-NVR-8432-JN; TI-QX4-NVR-8432-H8; TI-QX4-NVR-8404-JN	Ludhiana, punjab, India
OZONE WallCam	OWC-DV-03-CH016S1H8E; OWC-MD-01-CH04SD2G; OWC-DV01-CH08M5S1H8-5	Gurugram, Haryana, India
XPIA-I	XP-DV-5004 ECO; XP-NV-4016 PRO; XP-NV-4036 PRO; XP-NV-4032 PRO	Delhi, India
HAWK'S EYE	BIS-NVR-4CH; BIS-NVR-32CH; BIS-DVR-8CH	Mohali, Punjab, India
COVERT SECURE	CO-NV4242NH-K2; CO-NV4442NH-K4; CO-NV6142NH-K1; CO-NV6242NH-K2	Okhla, New delhi, India
ZEBRONICS	ZEB-16F1DA2H1-5MPL; ZEB-32F1DA12H8-8MPL; ZEB-4F1DA1H1-5MPL	South delhi, India
AVAZONIC	AVZ-RN32, AVZ-RN16, AVZ-RD32, AVZ-RD16, AVZ-RN08, AVZ-RN04,	Ajmer, Rajasthan, India
CVG	CV-N7-8104SH, CV-N9-8232SH, CV-N9-24EX-R, CV-N8-8224S, CV-N8-8116SH	Ghatlodia, Gujarat, India
HasHTVS	MDVR-404S, HSD-7032D, HSD-6308D, HSN-6464N	Gurgaon Haryana, India
SECUREYE	S-NVR-3, S-NVR-4, S-NVR-5, S-NVR-6, S-XVR-1, S-XVR-10, S-NVR-1	Delhi, India
E-VISION	EVNVR16, EV NVR 6000-25EX, EVNVR6001-36 EX, EVNVR6001-64 EX,	Faridabad, Haryana, India
Ambicam	VM-72XVR,VM-72XVR128,VM-72XVR16, VM-72XVR32, VM-72XVR8,VM-72XVRB	Ahmedabad, India
PLEXONICS	PL-7416ENVR, PL-7208ENVR, PL-7204ENVR, PL-6224D-NSR-R, PL-7436ENVR,	Chandigarh, India
SPARSH	SR-NV16F601-HP; SR-NV08F601-H; SRNL04F601-HP; SR-NV16F608-HE; NVR16	Haridwar, Uttarakhand, India
	SR-NP3232F5H-H(D)(E)(P), SR-NP3232F5H-H(D)(E)(P)-32, SR-NV32F608-HE
HIFOCUS	HD-XVR-4161H1-H, HD-XVR-4401H1-H, HD-XVR-4801H1-H	Andhra pradesh, India
EYEFOCUS	EF-0204NR,EF-0208NR,EF-0216NR, EF-0404QD-U,EF-0408HDR,EF-0416HDR	Kolkata, west bengal, India
SECURICO	SEC-N04 FH7; SEC - N16 GH7, SEC-N08 FH7, SEC-M04 FH7,	Haridwar, Uttarakhand, India
iSecure IT	ISEC5MPFIDO, ISEC5MPFIBU, ISEC5MPVADO, ISEC5MPVABU,	Thane, Maharashtra, India

Some OEM with Out of India factory-based BIS approved Model number

Brand Name	BIS approved Model Number	Factory Located
PELCO	IXP13, IXP23, IXP33, IXP53, IMP131-1ERS, IMP131-1IRS, IBP231-1ER, IBP232-1ER,	TAOYUAN CITY, TAIWAN
	IWP133-1ERS, IWP232-1ERS, IWP233-1ERS, S7822L-EBO, D7818L, P2820-ESR
	IME238-1ERS, IME332-1ERS, IBE338-1ER, IBE238-1ER, IXE33, IXE23, IXE53, IXE83	NEW TAIPEI CITY, TAIWAN
AXIS	AXIS Q6074-E 50Hz, AXIS Q6075-E 50Hz, AXIS Q8685-E 24V AC/DC,	Poland
	AXIS P3367-V, AXIS P3225-LV, AXIS P3717-PLE, AXIS P3245-LV, AXIS M3075-V	AGUASCALIENTES, MEXICO
	AXIS P3915-R, AXIS P3915-R, AXIS M1125, AXIS P3905-R	NAGASAKI, JAPAN
	Q8741-LE, Q8742-LE, Q6215-LE, Q8742-E, Q8742-E, Q2901-E,	LUND, Sweden
	P1435-LE, P1425-LE, P1448-LE, M3045-V, P1367-E, P1368-E, M2026-LE, P1367,	PATHUMTHANI, THAILAND
	AXIS Q6155-E 50Hz, AXIS V5914 50Hz, AXIS V5915 50Hz	JIRNY, Czech Republic
	P3374-V, P3375-LV, P3375-V, M1124, M1124, M1125, M1125, M3104-LVE, P1364	KWIDZYN, POLAND
BOSCH	DIP-5044EZ-1HD, DIP-5044EZ-4HD, DIP-5042EZ-2HD,  DIP-5042EZ-0HD	NEW TAIPEI CITY, TAIWAN
	DIP-6188-8HD, DIP-6184-8HD, DIP-6183-4HD, DIP-6180-00N, DIP-7183-8HD,	TAOYUAN CITY, TAIWAN
	NIN-73013-A10A, NHT-8001-F17VS, NHT-8001-F35VF, MIC-9502-Z30BVS	OVAR, PORTUGAL
AVIGILON	AIRPD1	NEW TAIPEI CITY, TAIWAN
	APTZC1, ASLBD1, APROD1, ADOMS1, ADOMC1, BDOMC1, BDOMP1, BBULD1	RICHMOND, BC, CANADA
VIVOTEK	ND9441P, ND9541P, ND9424P, ND9424P-v2, ND9541P, ND9441P, ND9312	NEW TAIPEI CITY, TAIWAN
	FD9367-HTV, FD9167-H, FD9167-HT, FD9171-HT, IB9371-HT, IB9381-HT, IP9181-H,
WISENET (HANWHA)	XNO-6120R, QNO-7020R, QNO-7030R, QNO-7010R, PNP-9200RH, LNO-6010R,	BAC NINH CITY, Vietnam
	XND-6080, PNF-9010RV, HCD-6070R, QNV-6070R, QNV-7080R, QNP-6230H
	HRD-1642P, HRD-842P, XRN-3010, HRX-1620, XRN-2010, XRN-2010A, XRN-2011,
GANZ	ZN1A-B4DZF56U, ZN1A-B4DZF69U, ZN-P2X30-DL, ZN-VD8F28-DL, ZN-VD8M310-DLP	South Korea
IDIS	DC-D4212R, DC-D4213RX, DC-D4213WRX, DC-D4223RX, DR-1308P, DR-1304P,	South Korea
LILIN	PSR5024EX30, MR832, MR302, MG1022, UHG1122, SR7428X, SG1122, ZR8022X10	TAIPEI CITY, TAIWAN
Illustra (TYCO)	IPS12FFOCWIY, IPS12FFOCWIYA, IPS12FFOCWIYA-IN, ISS04B1ONWIT	TAIPEI CITY, TAIWAN
	ADCi600F-D021a, IFS03B1BNWIT, ADCi600F-D111a, IPS02-D12-OI03, IPS02-D17-OI03.
	ADCi610-M111, ADCi600-M111, IQS02MFONWTY, IQS02CFICWSN, IQS020CFICW	South Korea

Indian companies trusted surveillance software	Location
COM-SUR (Hayagriva Software)	Mumbai, Maharastra, India
AllGoVision	Bengaluru, India
i2V (Intelligent Integrated Video)	Gurugram, Haryana, India
Silversparro	Gurugram, Haryana, India
Videonetics	Kolkata, West Bengal, India

Out of India trusted surveillance software	Location
Milestone Systems	Denmark
Mirasys Ltd	Helsinki, Finland
AxxonSoft	North America
Genetec Inc.	Quebec, Canada
IntelliVision	San Jose, CA, USA

Source:

https://ipvm.com/reports/ban-law

https://ipvm.com/reports/bloomberg-hisilicon

https://ipvm.com/reports/axis-companion-ndaa

https://ipvm.com/reports/blacklist-delay

https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-08-13/pdf/2019-17201.pdf