Electronic Surveillance Threats

Electronic Surveillance Threats 

In 2017 the Supreme Court ruled in a landmark judgment that privacy is a fundamental right. From sophisticated spyware attacks to mass phishing via smartphones and the rise of facial recognition technology, the range and reach of surveillance threats to human rights defenders is growing.

For security teams trying to keep activists safe, it is a cat-and-mouse game as attackers rapidly adapt to developments aimed at protection.

“When cyber-attackers see people are switching to using (messaging app) Signal, for example, then they will try to target Signal. If people start changing to VPN technology, they will start blocking VPN technology. If people are using Tor browser, they will target Tor traffic,” says Ramy Raoof, tactical technologist with Amnesty Tech.

Automated surveillance equipment has become increasingly common and connected, making the technique more covert and pervasive.  Mobile hacking, social engineering, network monitoring, face recognition technologies, GPS tracking, and various other methods commonly employed to catch and prevent crime and terrorism can also be used against civilians.

Electronic surveillance threats – defending a facility against electronic surveillance is a serious challenge and one that hasn’t been made any easier by the proliferation of computer networks and wireless. Not only are businesses under threat from phone tapping, and video and audio surveillance, wired and wireless computer networks offer attackers a new dimension of intrusion.

Even the simplest electronic surveillance devices are diverse, with room transmitters being among the most common. Their role is to detect all the environmental noise emanating from the location in which they’re planted.

Primary variations with room transmitters relate to differences in power sources. In this case, either battery or mains power and it’s the battery powered devices that are most diverse. Such devices can be secreted inside almost any object allowing for their minimal space requirements. Examples include the inside of pens, calculators, clocks, photo frames, under carpet, behind curtains and underneath or inside furniture.

The types of battery used to power these devices varies too, depending on the design, size and planned use of the device. Self-contained transmitters designed for surreptitious surveillance favour small button batteries or higher performance hearing aid batteries. When size is less of a concern and length of transmission a higher priority, larger and longer lasting batteries can be used, including the latest lithium types.

Average transmission devices typically have dimensions around 19mm x 12mm x 9mm. Should a small transmitter be built into a pen or a calculator, transmission range will be limited, around 15-20m, though the use of lithium batteries will increase the range.

Mains-powered room transmitters draw current either directly from the mains voltage or trickle charge a battery that’s also used to power the device. The advantages of this technique where electronic intruders are concerned include the fact there will be less impact on main power sources that could be monitored for fluctuations. Should mains power be lost the device will continue to operate.

The key technical issue for mains powered transmitters is to reduce 240V of alternating current to a direct current, low voltage output of 6-18V. Designers are required to combine transmission circuitry along with a voltage dropper, rectification, smoothing and voltage stabilization circuits.

As a rule, the most popular way to get the small current and voltage requirements is to use a high voltage capacitor to act as resistance at the 50/60Hz mains supply frequency. Low power can be partially offset by injecting some radio power into the mains.

Should there be enough room and a sufficiently low risk of detection, it’s sometimes possible for a stepdown transformer to be used – this is inherently more reliable that capacitor leakage or dropper resistance techniques. It’s also possible for a transformer to supply a far greater level of power to a strong transmitter.

AC units can be located inside walls, ceilings, under floors, inside office equipment, in mains-powered clocks and within lamps and lamp holders to name just a few possibilities. One of the favoured methods of installing an AC bug is to simply plug in a dummy double adaptor to a power point in the room you wish monitor. Despite the simplicity of this technique, only the most observant would notice and even then, would be most unlikely to consider the appearance of the unit a threat to security.

Electronic intruders wishing to secure a standalone mains-powered transmitter are usually supplied with a square plastic box about 50mm x 50mm x 18mm, or an encapsulating board. There will be a pair of trailing leads coming from these units for connection to the live and neutral lines of domestic AC.

There are still PSTN telephone transmitters. These are connected to target telephone systems and transmit information to a receiving station located nearby. The 2 basic models are the series-connected transmitter and the parallel-connected transmitter. Both types either draw their operating voltage from the PSTN phone line itself, or carry their own batteries that may be trickle-charged from the phone line.

Series connected transmitters are connected between a telephone socket and a telephone. In this configuration, only that extension will be accessed by the listener. But in the event a series transmitter is used and located on the incoming wires of a 2-pair cable on the other side of a telephone socket, all extensions of the line can be accessed.

Muliplex telephone systems make life extremely hard for electronic intruders trying to record communications. Because these systems multiplex more than one signal onto a 2-pair cable, an intruder would need to employ a de-multiplexer to access phones.

Partially connected transmitters are different. Both incoming feed wires are connected to the parallel connected device, and this means the information will be transmitted if either phone is used. With a series device, the wiring of the telephone must be disconnected to allow insertion of the transmitter. But installation doesn’t mean cutting and stripping of feed wires. Instead, the device can be installed in a junction box that offers sufficient room, or even in a telephone.

Series devices are easiest for security managers to detect using one of the counter surveillance devices on the market that alert security staff to temporary disconnection of phone lines. It’s possible for alarm panels monitoring alarm systems to also monitor phone lines for integrity, with any breaches then reported.

Parallel series devices, however, can be installed without temporary line breaks and without effect on resistance. This makes them harder to detect, though if the unit is drawing power from its host, this will cause a voltage drop. Parallel devices are often equipped with alligator clips requiring no more than a few millimetres of cable to be stripped or a pair of bare terminals.

Battery-powered types are harder to detect and more effective in their operation. With their greater operating current, they can achieve greater operating ranges than bugs, giving 500-1000m ranges instead of 25-50m. Even harder to detect are small rain-proof telephone transmitters that can be connected to any point of the exterior wiring as it leaves a building or joins a telephone pole. Such a device might never be detected.

Mobile phones are usually tapped using spyware. This is a whole other science – it’s possible for experts to search for spyware and users might notice quirks like rapid battery drain, though it can be difficult to know whether this is caused by an illicit piece of software, too many open apps, or simply an aging battery.

There are 2 primary groups of microphones available to an individual or organization seeking illicit access to communications. These are omnidirectional and unidirectional. Unidirectional microphones are portable and can be aimed at a target. They’re a parabolic dish-mount device that can be hand-held or tripod mounted. Such units offer excellent results for the electronic intruder. Using a 45cm reflector, high quality sound can be obtained at 250m. This performance increases fourfold if the reflector size is doubled but the unit becomes much more visible.

Omnidirectional units pick up audio signals coming from any point of the compass and in surveillance devices they usually have a diameter of about 6mm. As a rule, these devices will be more effective towards the front. Another type of microphone, the spike mike, is mounted on the end of a spike or probe. Microphones can be connected to the audio input of a miniature transmitter, allowing remote monitoring of conversations.

Like any other internet-connected device, surveillance systems can be vulnerable to attacks without the right cyber-security measures in place. Hackers can easily gain access to poorly configured devices with design flaws or faulty firmware and manipulate or steal data. With cyber-attacks accelerating, surveillance systems need to be protected from vulnerabilities, and require the same vigilance provided to IT systems.

Closed-circuit video cameras to transmit a signal to a specific place, on a limited set of monitors. It differs from broadcast television in that the signal is not openly transmitted, though it may employ point-to-point (P2P), point-to-multipoint (P2MP), or mesh wired or wireless links but transmit a signal to a specific place only. Not for open to all.

Cities in at least 56 countries worldwide have deployed surveillance technologies powered by automatic data mining, facial recognition, and other forms of artificial intelligence.

The ban that prohibits the purchase and installation of video surveillance equipment from HikVision, Dahua and Hytera Communications in federal installations – passed on year 2018 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). In conjunction with the ban’s implementation, the government has also published a Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) that outlines interim rules for how it will be applied moving forward. Like NFPA, now NDAA law accept globally.

Rules outlined in this FAR include:

·        A “solicitation provision” that requires government contractors to declare whether a bid includes covered equipment under the act;

·        Defines covered equipment to include commercial items, including commercially available off-the-shelf (COTS) items, which the rule says, “may have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities;”

·        Requires government procurement officers to modify indefinite delivery contracts to include the FAR clause for future orders;

·        Extends the ban to contracts at or below both the Micro-Purchase Threshold ($10,000) and Simplified Acquisition Threshold ($250,000), which typically gives agencies the ability to make purchases without federal acquisition rules applying.

·        Prohibits the purchase and installation of equipment from Chinese telecom giants Huawei and ZTE Corporation. This would also presumably extend to Huawei subsidiary Hisilicon, whose chips are found in many network cameras;

·        And, gives executive agency heads the ability grant a one-time waiver on a case-by-case basis for up to a two-year period.

Specifically, NDAA Section 889 creates a general prohibition on telecommunications or video surveillance equipment or services produced or provided by the following companies (and associated subsidiaries or affiliates):

·        Huawei Technologies Company; or

·        ZTE Corporation

It also prohibits equipment or services used specifically for national security purposes, such as public safety or security of government facilities, provided by the following companies (and associated subsidiaries or affiliates):

·        Hytera Communications Corporation;

·        Hangzhou HikVision Digital Technology Company; or

·        Dahua Technology Company

While the prohibitions are initially limited to the five named companies, Section 889 authorizes the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence or the Director of the FBI, to extend these restrictions to additional companies based on their relationships to the Chinese Government. The prohibitions will take effect for executive-branch agencies on August 13, 2019, one year after the date of the enactment of the 2019 NDAA, and will extend to beneficiaries of any grants, loans, or subsidies from such agencies after an additional year.

The provisions of Section 889 are quite broad, and key concepts are left undefined, such as how the Secretary of Defense is to determine what constitutes an entity that is “owned or controlled by, or otherwise connected to” a covered foreign country, or how the head of an agency should determine whether a component is “substantial,” “essential,” or “critical” to the system of which it is part. The statute also fails to address the application of the prohibitions to equipment produced by U.S. manufacturers that incorporate elements supplied by the covered entities as original equipment manufacturers (“OEMs”) or other kinds of supplier relationships.

Section 889 contains two exceptions under which its prohibitions do not apply:

(1) It allows Executive agencies to procure services that connect to the facilities of a third party, “such as backhaul, roaming, or interconnection arrangements.” This likely means telecommunications providers are permitted to maintain common network arrangements with the covered entities.

(2) It permits covered telecommunications equipment that is unable to “route or redirect user data traffic or permit visibility into any user data or packets” it might handle, meaning a contractor may still be able to provide services to the Government so long as any covered equipment provided is unable to interact or access the data it handles.

The Constitution of India guarantees every citizen the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21. The Supreme Court, in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017), ruled that privacy is a fundamental right. But this right is not unbridled or absolute. The Central government, under Section 69 of the Information Technology (IT) Act, 2000, has the power to impose reasonable restrictions on this right and intercept, decrypt or monitor Internet traffic or electronic data whenever there is a threat to national security, national integrity, security of the state, and friendly relations with other countries, or in the interest of public order and decency, or to prevent incitement to commission of an offence.

Only in such exceptional circumstances, however, can an individual’s right to privacy be superseded to protect national interest. The Central government passed the IT (Procedure and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring and Decryption of Information) Rules, 2009, that allow the Secretary in the Home Ministry/Home Departments to authorise agencies to intercept, decrypt or monitor Internet traffic or electronic data. In emergency situations, such approval can be given by a person not below the Joint Secretary in the Indian government. In today’s times, when fake news and illegal activities such as cyber terrorism on the dark web are on the rise, the importance of reserving such powers to conduct surveillance cannot be undermined.

Risk of Electronic Security Threats to EHR/HIS is a critical issue because as per the privacy and security rule of The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) the patient’s medical records are to be secured and private which can be accessible only the hospital authorities and the doctors in charge of the patient and the patient himself.

More advanced techniques now no longer require a target to actively click on a link in order to infect a device, explains Amnesty Tech security researcher Etienne Maynier. An attack using NSO spyware on an activist in Morocco covertly intercepted the activist’s web browsing to infect their phone with spyware. “Instead of waiting for you to click on a link, they instead hijack your web browser’s traffic and redirect you to a malicious website which tries to secretly install spyware,” says Maynier.

Successful targeting of well-protected phones is becoming more common and security teams are under added pressure from a burgeoning industry in so-called ‘zero-day’ exploits, in which unscrupulous hackers seek to find unknown vulnerabilities in software to sell. In May 2019, NSO Group exploited a zero-day vulnerability in WhatsApp that was used to target more than 100 human rights activists across the world with spyware.

How to keep your communications safe:

Using public Wi-Fi and VPNs: When you connect to Wi-Fi in a cafe or airport your internet activities are routed through that network. If attackers are on the network, they could capture your personal data. By using a VPN app on your devices, you protect your online activities when accessing public connections, preventing your internet activities from being seen by others on the same network. If you want to explore options, try NordVPN and TunnelBear.

Password management: Using a password manager means you don’t have to worry about forgetting passwords and can avoid using the same ones. It’s a tool that creates and safely stores strong passwords for you, so you can use many different passwords on different sites and services. There are various password managers such as KeePassXC , 1Password or Lastpass. Remember to back up your password manager database. Do not use password like password, ddmmyyyy, admin@123, administrator, administrator1, Super@1234 etc.

Messaging apps: When we advise human rights defenders about messaging apps, we assess each app on its policies (such as terms of service, privacy agreement), its technology (if it’s open source, available for review, has been audited, security) and finally the situation (if the app provides the features and functionality that fits the need and threat model). Generally speaking, Signal and Wire are two apps with strong privacy features.  Remember: Signal requires a SIM card to register, and for Wire you can sign up with a username/email.

Phone basics for iPhone or Android: Only download apps from the official app store to prevent your personal information from being accessed without your consent and to minimise the risk of attacks. Update your system and apps frequently to ensure they have the latest security patches. Enable ‘account recovery’ in case you lose access to your phone. Finally, choose a mobile screen lock that is not easily guessed, such as an 8-digit pin or an alphanumeric code.