NDAA
& Video Surveillance
Closed-circuit
television (CCTV), also known as video surveillance, is the use
of video cameras to transmit a signal to a specific place, on a
limited set of monitors. It differs from broadcast television in that
the signal is not openly transmitted, though it may employ point-to-point
(P2P), point-to-multipoint (P2MP), or mesh wired or wireless
links but transmit a signal to a specific place only. Not for open to all.
An
early mechanical CCTV system was developed in June 1927 by Russian
physicist Léon Theremin. Originally requested by the Soviet of Labour and Défense,
the system consisted of a manually-operated scanning-transmitting camera and
wireless shortwave transmitter and receiver, with a resolution of a hundred
lines.
One
of the first recorded application for closed circuit television system (CCTV)
was back in 1942. It was used to view the launch of V2 rockets in
Germany. In the US, commercial surveillance applications began
around 1947.
The
goal of this history is to help professionals newer to the industry understand
the important business and technology shifts that impact the market today,
including:
1950
- Colour cameras became available.
1957
– 1969: a number of companies such as General Precision Labs (GPL
division), provided CCTV camera systems
1970
– 1999: Videocassette recorders (VCR) era.
2000
– 2005: DVR Era
2001
- 9/11 Impact
2006
- Infancy IP and VMS (Axis introduced the first IP cameras in 1996)
2008
– 2012: MP Cameras Go H.264, Main player are PELCO, Hanwha (Samsung), Axis,
Infinova, Flir, Indigo Vision, AVTECH etc.
2009
– 2013: Cloud Hype / Bursts
2010
– 2018: Struggles for Video Analytics, WDR and Low Light Improvements
2012
– 2014: Rise and Fall of Edge Storage
2015
Smart CODECs Rise
2018
H.265 Mainstream
Storage
No Longer Major Problem
Slowing
of Camera Resolution Increases
HD
Analog Rises 2014, Niche Now
Rise
Cybersecurity 2015 - Current
2013
– 2017: Rise of The Chinese
2015
– 2017: Race to The Bottom
2018
- Now US vs China.
2019
- Rise AI and Cloud Startups
2020
- Coronavirus Impact - Elevated skin temperatures camera & globally reject
China factory made product.
 |
| Source: IPVM |
In
2014, a US ally observed a malicious actor attacking the US State Department
computer systems. In response the NSA traced the attacker’s source and
infiltrated their computer systems gaining access to their CCTV cameras from
where they were able to observe the hackers’ comings and goings.
In
October 2016, 600,000 internet connected cameras, DVR’s, routers and other IoT
devices were compromised and used to for a massive Bot Net to launch what was
the largest Denial of Service (DOS) attack the internet had experienced to
date.
In
the lead up to the 2017 US Presidential inauguration, 65% of the
recording servers for the city of Washington CCTV system were infected with
ransomware. How did the attack take place? Whilst unknown, it most likely
occurred by the same means as other common PC hacks such as infected USB keys,
malicious web sites, or phishing attacks.
May,
2018, over 60 Canon cameras in Japan were hacked with “I’m Hacked. bye2”
appearing in the camera display text. How did the attack take place?
Simple. IP cameras were connected to the internet and were left on default
credentials. It appears that the hackers logged into the cameras and changed
the on-screen display. What was the impact? Other the defacement of the camera
displays and some reputational damage, there doesn’t seem to have been much
impact from these attacks.
On
Aug 13, 2018, The US President has signed the 2019 NDAA into law, banning
the use of Dahua and HikVision (and their OEMs) for the US government, for US
government-funded contracts and possibly for 'critical infrastructure' and
'national Security’ usage.
US
government is effectively blacklisting Dahua and HikVision products, this will
have a severe branding and consequentially purchasing impact. Many buyers will
be concerned about:
What
security risks those products pose for them
What
problems might occur if they want to integrate with public / government systems
What
future legislation at the state or local level might ban usage of such systems
On
Jun 06, 2019 Hanwha Techwin is dropping Huawei Hisilicon from all of their
products. Its belongs to China’s origin. Backdoor entry is open on product.
China's
Wuhan Institute of Virology, the lab at the core of coronavirus. The institute
is home to the China Centre for Virus Culture Collection, the largest virus
bank in Asia which preserves more than 1,500 strains ( https://www.livemint.com/news/world/china-s-wuhan-institute-of-virology-the-lab-at-the-core-of-a-virus-controversy-11587266870143.html
). Result Corona has infected people in 185 countries. Its spread has left
businesses around the world counting the costs. Global economy impact. Recession
increase. Now people avoid to get china factory made product, electronics goods
importing has stopped from china to other country. People looking for product except
china. Now come to Video surveillance, access control equipment.
The
ban that prohibits the purchase and installation of video surveillance
equipment from Hikvision, Dahua and Hytera Communications in federal
installations – passed on year 2018 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).
In conjunction with the ban’s implementation, the government has also published
a Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) that outlines interim rules for how
it will be applied moving forward. Like NFPA, now NDAA law accept globally.
Rules
outlined in this FAR include:
·
A
“solicitation provision” that requires government contractors to declare
whether a bid includes covered equipment under the act;
·
Defines
covered equipment to include commercial items, including commercially available
off-the-shelf (COTS) items, which the rule says, “may have a significant
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities;”
·
Requires
government procurement officers to modify indefinite delivery contracts to
include the FAR clause for future orders;
·
Extends
the ban to contracts at or below both the Micro-Purchase Threshold ($10,000)
and Simplified Acquisition Threshold ($250,000), which typically gives agencies
the ability to make purchases without federal acquisition rules applying.
·
Prohibits
the purchase and installation of equipment from Chinese telecom giants Huawei
and ZTE Corporation. This would also presumably extend to Huawei subsidiary
Hisilicon, whose chips are found in many network cameras;
·
And,
gives executive agency heads the ability grant a one-time waiver on a
case-by-case basis for up to a two-year period.
Specifically,
NDAA Section 889 creates a general prohibition on telecommunications
or video surveillance equipment or services produced or provided by the
following companies (and associated subsidiaries or affiliates):
·
Huawei
Technologies Company; or
·
ZTE
Corporation
It
also prohibits equipment or services used specifically for national
security purposes, such as public safety or security of government
facilities, provided by the following companies (and associated subsidiaries or
affiliates):
·
Hytera
Communications Corporation;
·
Hangzhou
Hikvision Digital Technology Company; or
·
Dahua
Technology Company
While
the prohibitions are initially limited to the five named companies, Section 889
authorizes the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Director of National
Intelligence or the Director of the FBI, to extend these restrictions to
additional companies based on their relationships to the Chinese Government.
The prohibitions will take effect for executive-branch agencies on August 13,
2019, one year after the date of the enactment of the 2019 NDAA, and will
extend to beneficiaries of any grants, loans, or subsidies from such agencies
after an additional year.
The
provisions of Section 889 are quite broad, and key concepts are left undefined,
such as how the Secretary of Defense is to determine what constitutes an entity
that is “owned or controlled by, or otherwise connected to” a covered foreign
country, or how the head of an agency should determine whether a component is
“substantial,” “essential,” or “critical” to the system of which it is part.
The statute also fails to address the application of the prohibitions to
equipment produced by U.S. manufacturers that incorporate elements supplied by
the covered entities as original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) or other
kinds of supplier relationships.
Section
889 contains two exceptions under which its prohibitions do not apply:
(1)
It allows Executive agencies to procure services that connect to the facilities
of a third party, “such as backhaul, roaming, or interconnection arrangements.”
This likely means telecommunications providers are permitted to maintain common
network arrangements with the covered entities.
(2) It
permits covered telecommunications equipment that is unable to “route or
redirect user data traffic or permit visibility into any user data or packets”
it might handle, meaning a contractor may still be able to provide services to
the Government so long as any covered equipment provided is unable to interact
or access the data it handles.
 |
| Update on 2018; IPVM Source |
Hikvision
is one of the world’s largest video surveillance companies producing
both hardware and software tools. It is central to China’s ambitions to become
the world’s leading supplier of surveillance systems. Hikvision sells cameras
and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) allowing security agencies to monitor
railway stations, roads, etc. It is a darling of the Communist Party of China
(CPC), having been heralded as a ‘national AI Champion” in 2019.
As
per a 2019 report, around 42 per cent of the company is controlled by
state enterprises, with China Electronics Technology HIK Group owning nearly 40
per cent. Hikvision controlled 21 per cent of the world’s CCTV market in 2017.
Hikvision
exists in India under the name Prama Hikvision Indian Private Limited. As
per reports, Hikvision enjoys over 35 per cent market share in India. Its
2019 annual report said it has established a local factory in
India — its first overseas production base. It is 58 per cent owned by the
parent Chinese company. The Indian partner is Ashish P. Dhakan, who started the
collaboration in 2005. It has declared serious investment plans for
India.
In
2018, it won a tender from the Delhi government to install 1.5 lakh
CCTV cameras in the national capital. It is also listed as a vendor by Bharat
Electronics (BEL), which works on highly sensitive and classified defence
projects for the government of India. More worryingly, Hikvision has allegedly also
supplied solutions to Delhi Metro Rail Corporation (DMRC), Defence Research and
Development Organisation (DRDO), and the Special Protection Group (SPG), which
is responsible for the security of the prime minister. Link
Clearly,
the security and privacy risks at play here are best left
to one’s imagination.
This
leaves India with a tricky situation. Admittedly such companies do create
secondary economic benefits for India with the local assembly and selling units
creating jobs at home. However, there is arguably a bigger price India pays in
terms of handing its CCTV grid to a country that is in no mood to offer any
concessions to us.
 |
| Update on 2018; IPVM Source |
 |
| Update on 2018; IPVM Source |
For
starters, the Modi government needs to make a clear list or database of all its
current installations. Second, it needs to review all installations that would
be considered critical or with a national security implication, and then
seriously consider replacing them with a local alternative. If that is not
feasible, the government needs to wrap such installations with third party
(non-Chinese) encryption tools, which would disable any back doors that may
exist. Third,
India must prohibit Hikvision from participating in any ongoing or future
government tenders. Fourth, the government needs to contemplate increasing
local ownership and control of the Indian subsidiary. An innovative solution
would be to purchase the 58 per cent stake in Hikvision — either the government
could be an investor or it could be enabled by other Indian businesses or
funds. Fifth, the Modi government needs to impose a legal obligation for
regular audits to check for any security vulnerabilities with serious penalties
for non-compliance or negligence.
Lastly,
like the Chinese, India too needs to create local champions. In India, this is
always the hardest part — less access to capital, poor procurement processes,
etc. Most of the technology and subcomponents for Hikvision come from the
United States. It is important to remind ourselves that with enough government
support, India too can build local champions of technology. Link
Often
those on the government procurement side use price as an excuse to prefer
Chinese over Indian vendors. But it’s a lazy argument. Yes, Chinese vendors and
their products are often cheaper, but it is because they have worked on these
things for decades. Cheap is also not always better and certainly not more
secure.
As
India considers the next steps, it is important to not penalise and demonise
the Indian entrepreneur behind the local subsidiary. They are not to blame. It
shouldn’t take a border stand-off and loss of lives for such issues to be
tackled head-on.
Now
question how we design a CCTV project respect to product selection. Many
institutional purchaser want to stop such camouflaged OEM from their
procurement activities. Yeah this is very hard to say this company are not tie-up
with china-based company. As we are belonging to India, Atmanirbhar Bharat (self-reliant
India) is the vision of the Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi of
making India a self-reliant nation. The first mention of this came in the form
of the 'Atmanirbhar Bharat Abhiyan' or 'Self-Reliant India Mission' during the
announcement of the coronavirus pandemic related economic package on 12 May
2020. Known china CCTV OEM are thrown out. Yes, it’s true, India don’t have
much infrastructure to generate Camera manufacturing plant, it will take time at
list 5 year. Within this time, we can follow BIS website to get information
about selected camera / NVR model are china factory make or not. Low cost and
high cost both option camera you can found. If you found that model belongs to
china factory immediately change with Closest or Alternative Substitute.
Dahua
Model: IPC-HFW8630E-ZE is Closest to Pelco model: IBP521-1R & Alternative
Substitute is IBP521-1R.
Dahua
Model: SD10A248V-HNI is Closest to Pelco model: P2230-ESR & Alternative
Substitute is S6230-EGL1.
Hikvision
Model: DS-2CD4025FWD-AP is Closest to Pelco
model: IXE22
or IXE32.
Hikvision
Model: DS-2CD2125FWD-I 4MM is Closest to Pelco model: IMP221-1RS Or
IWP221-1ES/IJP223-1RS.
Yes PELCO is 1st OEM who get NDAA & share compatible camera with respect HikVision & dahua model number.
Yes PELCO is 1st OEM who get NDAA & share compatible camera with respect HikVision & dahua model number.
NDAA Compliance Product List.
|
Brands
|
Dome Camera
|
Bullet Camera
|
180° / Panoramic Cameras
|
360° Cameras / PTZ
|
NVR
|
Video Server
|
|
VIVOTEK
|
CD8371-HNTV,
CD8371-HNVF2, MD8531H, MD8563-DEH, IT9360-H, IT9380-H, IT9388-HT
FD816CA-HF2, FD8166A, FD8166A-N, FD8177-HT, FD8366-V, FD8377-EHTV, FD8377-HTV, FD9165-HT-A |
IB8377-EHT, IB8377-HT, IB9360-H, IB9365-EHT-A,
IB9365-HT-A, IB9368-HT, IB9380-H, IB9387-EHT-A, IB9387-HT-A, IB9388-HT,
IP9164-HT, IP9164-LPC
|
CC8160,
CC8370-HV, CC9381-HV
|
FE8182,
FE9380-EHV
|
NR9581,
NR9581-v2, NR9681, NR9681-v2, NR9682, NR9682-v2, NR9782 , NR9782-v2,
NS9521 |
VS8100-v2
|
|
Honeywell
|
HC60W35R2,
HC60W35R4, HC60W45R2, HC30W42R3, HC30W45R3,
|
HC60WB5R2,
HC60WB5R5, HC30WB2R1, HC30WB5R1, HC30WB5R2
|
HC30WF5R1
|
HC60WZ2E30,
|
HN30080200,
HN30160200, HNMXE08C02T, HNMXE16C02T, HNMSE16C02T, HNMSE32C02T, HNMSE48C04T,
HNMPE32C16T4R5
|
HERN30T5,
HERN40T5, HERN64T8, HERN72T12, HERN96T16, HERN128T16, HERN144T24, HERN192T24
|
|
PELCO
|
MP221-1RS,
IWP221-1ES, IJP222-1RS, IMP221-1RS, IWP221-1ES, IMP321-1RS, IMP521-1RS,
IBP221-1R, IMP521-1RS, IBP321-1R, IBP521-1R,
|
IBE222-1R,
IBE322-1R, IBE229-1R, IBE329-1R, IME329-1ES, IMP321-1ES, IBP522-1R,
IME229-1ES, IMP221-1ES, IBP521-1R, IBP221-1R, IBE329-1R, IBP221-1R
|
EVO-12NMD,
EVO-05LID, EVO-05LMD, EVO-05LID, EVO-05LMD, EVO-180-WED-P, IMM12018-1EP,
EVO-05NMD.
|
IMP521-1RS,
IME329-1IS, IWP221-1ES, IME322-1ES, IME229-1ES, MP122-1ES, IMP221-1ES,
S6230-FWL1, P1220-FWH1, S6230-EGL1, P1220-ESR1, S6230-EGL1, P2230-ESR,
|
|
|
|
AV
Costar
|
AV5456PMIR-S,
AV02CLD-100, AV05CLD-100, AV5456PMIR-S
|
AV5426PMIR-S,
AV02CLB-100, AV05CLB-100, AV5426PMIR-S, AV02CMB-100, AV05CMB-100
|
AV12CPD-236,
AV08CPD-118, AV20CPD-118
|
AV8476DN-NL,
AV8476DN-28, AV20476DN-NL, AV20476RS, AV20476DN-28, AV8476DN-NL,
AV8476RS, AV20476DN-NL
|
AV-CN1600-20T,
AV-CN800-8T, AV-CN1600-8T, AV-CN1600-6T, AV-CN1600-12T, AV-CSCX40TR,
AV-CSHPX12TR,
|
|
|
IDIS
|
DC-D4236RX
DC-D4236X DC-D4236HRX DC-D4236WRX DC-D4216RX DC-D4216X DC-D4216WRX |
DC-T4236HRX
DC-T4236WRX DC-E4216WRX |
|
|
IR-100
IR-300A IR-1100 |
|
|
AcTi
|
Z94,
Z95, Z83
|
Z33,
Z34, Z41
|
|
|
|
|
|
LILIN
|
P3R6322E2,
P3R6522E2, Z3R6522X, Z3R6422X3, P5R6322E2, P5R6552E2, Z5R6452X, P5R6522E2
|
Z2R8122X-P,
Z2R8022EX25, Z2R8822AX, Z2R8152X-P, Z5R8952X3, Z5R8922X3, P2R8852E2,
P2R8822E4, P3R8822E2
|
F2R3682IM,
F2R36C2IM
|
PSR5520EX25,
PSR5024EX30, IPS4184E, PSD4624EX20, IPS5180E, IPS4204EA, IPS5208A, IPS5308A,
IPS5200EA, IPS5300EA
|
NVR3416R,
NVR100L, NVR1400, NVR3416, NVR5416E, NVR5832S, NVR5104E, NVR5208E
|
NVR404C,
VS212, VD022
|
|
3s
Vision
|
N9071M-BE,
N9079-BE, N9049-BE, N9099-BE, N9019-B, N3031-C, N9072-A
|
N6091-BE,
N6041-BE, N6071-BE, N601A-EL, N6012-C
|
|
N5012H-BE,
N5049-BE,
|
R40244-B,
R10124-B, R10064-B, F20321, H40321, IB1281
|
S8072-B,
SG072-B, S4072-B
|
For
SOHO industry or small medium company, do start with making video data policy,
its very important, due to using Chinese owned product every country data is
now with hacker. Basically, china product is low price due to no standard
quality. Other country like Taiwan or Korea product not low price, due to they
maintain minimum quality of product. Now time to change, due to corona virus
people change lifestyle. Indian govt need to general prohibition on
telecommunications or video surveillance equipment or services produced.
Brand
Name
|
BIS approved Model Number
|
Factory Located
|
INFINOVA
|
VS220-A60B-A022,VS220-A60B-A062,VT240-A222-A3,VS221-A20B-B022,VS210-P2
|
Pune,
Maharashtra, India
|
VT-231-A230-C061,
VT231-A230-A061, VT231-A230-A061, VH121-A20E-A022-32G,
|
||
VT221-A20B-B022,
VT221-A20B-U062, VT220-A20B-S022, VH221-A40B-A022,
|
||
VS220-A20BB062,VS220-A20B-C022,VS220-A20B-C062,
VT230-A230-D061,
|
||
VT231-B230-D061,VS211-A20B-D0,VS211-A20E-C0,VS211-A20E-D0,VS211-A60B-A0
|
||
VH221-B402-A012,
VH221-B403-A012, VH221-B406-A012, VH221-B408-A012
|
||
VH221-B412-A012,VH211-B402,
VH211-B403-A0, VH211-B406-A0, VH211-B408-A0,
|
||
V3073-08J02;
V3073-16J02; V3073-24J02; V3073-64J16; V3073-128J16
|
||
Honeywell
|
HEICC-2301T;
HEIPTZ-2201W-IR; HABC-2305PIV; HADC-2005PI
|
Gurgaon
Haryana, India
|
WBOX
TECHNOLOGIES
|
0E-CVHD5R2FPNA28;
0E-CVHD5R2FPNA6; 0E-CVHB2R2FPNA6
|
Noida,
Uttar pradesh, India
|
D-LINK
|
DCS-F3611-L1,
DCS-F3711-L1, DCS-F3711-L1P
|
Haridwar,
Uttarakhand, India
|
TENTRONIX
|
TI-QX4-NVR-8432-JN;
TI-QX4-NVR-8432-H8; TI-QX4-NVR-8404-JN
|
Ludhiana,
punjab, India
|
OZONE
WallCam
|
OWC-DV-03-CH016S1H8E;
OWC-MD-01-CH04SD2G; OWC-DV01-CH08M5S1H8-5
|
Gurugram,
Haryana, India
|
XPIA-I
|
XP-DV-5004
ECO; XP-NV-4016 PRO; XP-NV-4036 PRO; XP-NV-4032 PRO
|
Delhi,
India
|
HAWK'S
EYE
|
BIS-NVR-4CH;
BIS-NVR-32CH; BIS-DVR-8CH
|
Mohali,
Punjab, India
|
COVERT
SECURE
|
CO-NV4242NH-K2;
CO-NV4442NH-K4; CO-NV6142NH-K1; CO-NV6242NH-K2
|
Okhla,
New delhi, India
|
ZEBRONICS
|
ZEB-16F1DA2H1-5MPL;
ZEB-32F1DA12H8-8MPL; ZEB-4F1DA1H1-5MPL
|
South
delhi, India
|
AVAZONIC
|
AVZ-RN32,
AVZ-RN16, AVZ-RD32, AVZ-RD16, AVZ-RN08, AVZ-RN04,
|
Ajmer,
Rajasthan, India
|
CVG
|
CV-N7-8104SH,
CV-N9-8232SH, CV-N9-24EX-R, CV-N8-8224S, CV-N8-8116SH
|
Ghatlodia,
Gujarat, India
|
HasHTVS
|
MDVR-404S,
HSD-7032D, HSD-6308D, HSN-6464N
|
Gurgaon
Haryana, India
|
SECUREYE
|
S-NVR-3,
S-NVR-4, S-NVR-5, S-NVR-6, S-XVR-1, S-XVR-10, S-NVR-1
|
Delhi,
India
|
E-VISION
|
EVNVR16,
EV NVR 6000-25EX, EVNVR6001-36 EX, EVNVR6001-64 EX,
|
Faridabad,
Haryana, India
|
Ambicam
|
VM-72XVR,VM-72XVR128,VM-72XVR16,
VM-72XVR32, VM-72XVR8,VM-72XVRB
|
Ahmedabad,
India
|
PLEXONICS
|
PL-7416ENVR,
PL-7208ENVR, PL-7204ENVR, PL-6224D-NSR-R, PL-7436ENVR,
|
Chandigarh,
India
|
SPARSH
|
SR-NV16F601-HP;
SR-NV08F601-H; SRNL04F601-HP; SR-NV16F608-HE; NVR16
|
Haridwar,
Uttarakhand, India
|
SR-NP3232F5H-H(D)(E)(P),
SR-NP3232F5H-H(D)(E)(P)-32, SR-NV32F608-HE
|
||
HIFOCUS
|
HD-XVR-4161H1-H,
HD-XVR-4401H1-H, HD-XVR-4801H1-H
|
Andhra
pradesh, India
|
EYEFOCUS
|
EF-0204NR,EF-0208NR,EF-0216NR,
EF-0404QD-U,EF-0408HDR,EF-0416HDR
|
Kolkata,
west bengal, India
|
SECURICO
|
SEC-N04
FH7; SEC - N16 GH7, SEC-N08 FH7, SEC-M04 FH7,
|
Haridwar,
Uttarakhand, India
|
iSecure
IT
|
ISEC5MPFIDO,
ISEC5MPFIBU, ISEC5MPVADO, ISEC5MPVABU,
|
Thane,
Maharashtra, India
|
Brand Name
|
BIS approved Model Number
|
Factory
Located
|
PELCO
|
IXP13, IXP23,
IXP33, IXP53, IMP131-1ERS, IMP131-1IRS, IBP231-1ER, IBP232-1ER,
|
TAOYUAN
CITY, TAIWAN
|
IWP133-1ERS,
IWP232-1ERS, IWP233-1ERS, S7822L-EBO, D7818L, P2820-ESR
|
||
IME238-1ERS,
IME332-1ERS, IBE338-1ER, IBE238-1ER, IXE33, IXE23, IXE53, IXE83
|
NEW
TAIPEI CITY, TAIWAN
|
|
AXIS
|
AXIS
Q6074-E 50Hz, AXIS Q6075-E 50Hz, AXIS Q8685-E 24V AC/DC,
|
Poland
|
AXIS
P3367-V, AXIS P3225-LV, AXIS P3717-PLE, AXIS P3245-LV, AXIS M3075-V
|
AGUASCALIENTES,
MEXICO
|
|
AXIS
P3915-R, AXIS P3915-R, AXIS M1125, AXIS P3905-R
|
NAGASAKI,
JAPAN
|
|
Q8741-LE,
Q8742-LE, Q6215-LE, Q8742-E, Q8742-E, Q2901-E,
|
LUND,
Sweden
|
|
P1435-LE,
P1425-LE, P1448-LE, M3045-V, P1367-E, P1368-E, M2026-LE, P1367,
|
PATHUMTHANI,
THAILAND
|
|
AXIS
Q6155-E 50Hz, AXIS V5914 50Hz, AXIS V5915 50Hz
|
JIRNY,
Czech Republic
|
|
P3374-V,
P3375-LV, P3375-V, M1124, M1124, M1125, M1125, M3104-LVE, P1364
|
KWIDZYN,
POLAND
|
|
BOSCH
|
DIP-5044EZ-1HD,
DIP-5044EZ-4HD, DIP-5042EZ-2HD,
DIP-5042EZ-0HD
|
NEW
TAIPEI CITY, TAIWAN
|
DIP-6188-8HD,
DIP-6184-8HD, DIP-6183-4HD, DIP-6180-00N, DIP-7183-8HD,
|
TAOYUAN
CITY, TAIWAN
|
|
NIN-73013-A10A,
NHT-8001-F17VS, NHT-8001-F35VF, MIC-9502-Z30BVS
|
OVAR,
PORTUGAL
|
|
AVIGILON
|
AIRPD1
|
NEW
TAIPEI CITY, TAIWAN
|
APTZC1,
ASLBD1, APROD1, ADOMS1, ADOMC1, BDOMC1, BDOMP1, BBULD1
|
RICHMOND,
BC, CANADA
|
|
VIVOTEK
|
ND9441P,
ND9541P, ND9424P, ND9424P-v2, ND9541P, ND9441P, ND9312
|
NEW
TAIPEI CITY, TAIWAN
|
FD9367-HTV,
FD9167-H, FD9167-HT, FD9171-HT, IB9371-HT, IB9381-HT, IP9181-H,
|
||
WISENET
(HANWHA)
|
XNO-6120R,
QNO-7020R, QNO-7030R, QNO-7010R, PNP-9200RH, LNO-6010R,
|
BAC
NINH CITY, Vietnam
|
XND-6080,
PNF-9010RV, HCD-6070R, QNV-6070R, QNV-7080R, QNP-6230H
|
||
HRD-1642P,
HRD-842P, XRN-3010, HRX-1620, XRN-2010, XRN-2010A, XRN-2011,
|
||
GANZ
|
ZN1A-B4DZF56U,
ZN1A-B4DZF69U, ZN-P2X30-DL, ZN-VD8F28-DL, ZN-VD8M310-DLP
|
South
Korea
|
IDIS
|
DC-D4212R,
DC-D4213RX, DC-D4213WRX, DC-D4223RX, DR-1308P, DR-1304P,
|
South
Korea
|
LILIN
|
PSR5024EX30,
MR832, MR302, MG1022, UHG1122, SR7428X, SG1122, ZR8022X10
|
TAIPEI
CITY, TAIWAN
|
Illustra
(TYCO)
|
IPS12FFOCWIY,
IPS12FFOCWIYA, IPS12FFOCWIYA-IN, ISS04B1ONWIT
|
TAIPEI
CITY, TAIWAN
|
ADCi600F-D021a,
IFS03B1BNWIT, ADCi600F-D111a, IPS02-D12-OI03, IPS02-D17-OI03.
|
||
ADCi610-M111,
ADCi600-M111, IQS02MFONWTY, IQS02CFICWSN, IQS020CFICW
|
South
Korea
|
Indian companies trusted surveillance software
|
Location
|
COM-SUR
(Hayagriva Software)
|
Mumbai,
Maharastra, India
|
AllGoVision
|
Bengaluru,
India
|
i2V
(Intelligent Integrated Video)
|
Gurugram,
Haryana, India
|
Silversparro
|
Gurugram,
Haryana, India
|
Videonetics
|
Kolkata,
West Bengal, India
|
Out of India trusted surveillance software
|
Location
|
Milestone
Systems
|
Denmark
|
Mirasys
Ltd
|
Helsinki,
Finland
|
AxxonSoft
|
North
America
|
Genetec
Inc.
|
Quebec,
Canada
|
IntelliVision
|
San
Jose, CA, USA
|
Source: