Codes Apply for Electromagnetic Locks

An electromagnetic lock (EM Lock) is essentially an electromagnet in a housing mounted on the door frame, and a steel armature mounted on the door wing. When the magnet is energized, it bonds to the armature and locks the door. To allow access or egress, a switch must be provided to de-energize the electromagnet. It can be difficult to determine which set of code requirements to follow. However, code compliance is crucial when this product is used in an access- or egress-control system. Unlike most locks, electromagnetic locks typically require external release devices such as motion sensors or request-to-exit switches to allow building occupants to exit. In addition, secondary means of releasing the mag-lock are often mandated by the codes, and the requirements vary depending on the type of locking system used.

Prior to the 2009 edition of the International Building Code (IBC), the set of code requirements typically used for doors equipped with electromagnetic locks was the section called Access-Controlled Egress Doors. The 2009 edition added a second set of requirements that could be used, called Electromagnetically Locked Egress Doors. Either of these two sets of requirements can now be used, depending on the application.

The basic difference between these two sections is that the original section, Access-Controlled Egress Doors, required a sensor and push button as release devices, while the new section, Electromagnetically Locked Egress Doors, allows a door-mounted release device instead. This could be panic hardware or a latchset with a request-to-exit (RX) switch, or a bar with an electronic touch sensor.

A building could have several AHJs (Authorities Having Jurisdiction), and more than one code may be enforced for a particular project. The most commonly used model codes in the U.S. are the International Building Code (IBC), the International Fire Code (IFC), and NFPA 101 – The Life Safety Code, but state and local codes sometimes include modifications that affect the use of electrified hardware. It’s usually best to follow the most stringent set of requirements that have been adopted in the project’s jurisdiction.

Here is a summary of the requirements for both sections from the 2009 IBC:

1008.1.4.4 Access-Controlled Egress Doors

·        Applies to entrance doors in a means of egress and entrance doors to tenant spaces.

·        Allowed in Use Groups - A (Assembly), B (Business), E (Educational), I-2 (Institutional - Hospitals & Nursing Homes), M (Mercantile), R-1 (Residential - Hotels, Motels, & Boarding Houses), and R-2 (Residential - Apartments & Dormitories).

·        A sensor must be mounted on the egress side to detect an occupant approaching the doors. Doors must unlock upon a signal from the sensor or loss of power to the sensor.

·        Loss of power to the lock must unlock the doors.

·        A manual unlocking device (push button) shall result in direct interruption of power to the lock – independent of the access control system electronics. When the push button is actuated, the doors must remain unlocked for 30 seconds minimum. The push button must include signage stating “Push to Exit” and must be located 40” to 48” vertically above the floor and within 5’ of the doors. Ready access must be provided to the push button.

·        If the building has a fire alarm/sprinkler system/fire detection system, activation of the system must automatically unlock the doors. Doors must remain unlocked until the system has been reset.

·        Entrance doors in buildings with an occupancy in Group A, B, E or M shall not be secured from the egress side during periods that the building is open to the general public.

1008.1.9.8 Electromagnetically Locked Egress Doors

·         Applies to doors in a means of egress and doors to tenant spaces. The 2009 IBC includes a limitation to doors “not otherwise required to have panic hardware,” which was removed in the 2012 edition.

·        Allowed in Use Groups - A (Assembly), B (Business), E (Educational), M (Mercantile), R-1 (Residential - Hotels, Motels, & Boarding Houses), and R-2 (Residential - Apartments & Dormitories).

·          The door must be equipped with listed hardware mounted on the door leaf, which incorporates a built-in switch to directly release the electromagnetic lock and unlock the door immediately.

·         The release device must have an obvious method of operation, and must be readily operated with one hand under all lighting conditions.

·            Loss of power to the listed hardware must automatically unlock the door.

·          When the new section was added to the 2009 IBC, the technical committee made a change to the proposed language which caused some confusion. A limitation to doors that are “not otherwise required to have panic hardware” was included in the 2009 edition, but it appears that this was not the intent. The limitation was removed and the intent clarified in the 2012 edition of the IBC, and as long as the switch in the panic bar releases the mag-lock, a door required to have panic hardware can be equipped with a mag-lock.

·        With the addition of Section 1008.1.9.8 – Electromagnetically Locked Egress Doors, the door-mounted release device can be used instead of the sensor and emergency push button. Note that this section does not require the mag-lock to release upon activation of the fire alarm or sprinkler system when a door-mounted release device is used. But there are a few issues that are still unclear, even with the 2012 changes.

·           The door must unlock upon loss of power to the “listed hardware,” which in this case is the door-mounted release device. Loss of power to some types of request-to-exit switches will not unlock the mag-lock. We may see a future change to the language so that loss of power to the electromagnetic lock is required to unlock the door, but the code currently addresses the release device.

·        I-2 occupancies (Institutional – Hospitals & Nursing Homes) are not included as acceptable locations for electromagnetically locked egress doors. This use group was added to the Access-Controlled Egress Doors section in the 2009 edition of the IBC, so hopefully the new section will catch up and include the I-2 use group in the future.

·        UL 305, the UL Standard for Panic Hardware, doesn’t address the use of panic hardware to release an electromagnetic lock. There is also a section of the IBC which states that certain doors shall not be equipped with a latch or lock unless it’s panic hardware. This should be changed to reflect the use of a mag-lock released by panic hardware.

The following summaries address each type of system where a mag-lock might be used, and the related model code requirements:

Sensor Release: A sensor automatically unlocks the electromagnetic lock to allow egress.

This is the most common type of system where electromagnetic locks are used. In past editions of the model codes, the applicable section referred to “access-controlled egress doors” which often gave the impression that the requirements applied to all doors with an access control system. A typical access control system which controls access but utilizes a lever handle or panic hardware to allow free egress is not required to comply with this section. The intent is for this section to apply only to electrified locks that are released by a sensor, and the title of this section has been changed in the model codes to clarify the intent.

For these systems, a sensor on the egress side of the door opening must detect an approaching occupant and unlock the door. The door must also unlock upon loss of power to the sensor or locking system, upon activation of the building fire alarm or automatic sprinkler system (until manually reset), and upon actuation of an auxiliary switch – typically a push button. This switch must be located 40-48 inches above the floor and within 5 feet of the door, must be readily accessible, and must be marked “PUSH TO EXIT.” Pushing the button must directly interrupt power to the lock, independent of the other electronics, and the door must remain unlocked for at least 30 seconds.

Recent editions of the IBC/IFC and NFPA 101 include virtually identical egress requirements for these systems, and all of these model codes currently require the UL 294 listing for these applications. It’s important to note that when this type of system is installed on a door that is required by code to have panic hardware, the panic hardware is required in addition to the electromagnetic lock.

Door-Hardware Release: A switch in the door-mounted hardware releases the electromagnetic lock to allow egress.

This type of system typically utilizes a request-to-exit (RX or REX) switch in the lever handle, panic hardware, or sensor bar mounted on the door. Again, the requirements of the IBC/IFC and NFPA 101 are very similar. The model codes require the hardware mounted on the door to have an obvious method of operation, and to be readily operable with one hand and under all lighting conditions. Operation of this door-mounted hardware must directly interrupt power to the electromagnetic lock, and the door must unlock immediately. The door must also unlock upon loss of power to the locking system, and the UL 294 listing is required by the current model codes. Note that this section does not require an auxiliary push button beside the door, or for the door to unlock upon activation of the fire protection system, although some local codes or AHJs may mandate these additional safety overrides.

Delayed Egress: Doors are locked to delay egress for 15 seconds under normal operation but allow immediate egress during an emergency.

There are two types of egress:

·        Free means that someone can exit an egress door without any delay by using only a single motion, such as turning a lever or pushing on a panic bar.

·        Delayed means that there’s a timed delay before someone can pass through the egress door and exit. Typically, this delay is 15 seconds.

Delayed egress is used to:

·        Discourage casual use of certain doors, so pedestrians can’t leave a premises or steal merchandise.

·        Deter elopement of patients, children or inmates from a protected area of a facility.

·        Make possible access control in both directions through selected openings.

Often, delayed egress systems include panic hardware with delayed egress circuitry, but electromagnetic locks are also available with this function. The lock includes an integral timer which allows the door to be opened 15 seconds after an attempt to exit is made – or 30 seconds when approved by the AHJ. The activation switch may be part of the mag-lock, or the timer may be initiated by an external RX switch.

To ensure free egress in an emergency, delayed egress locks must unlock immediately (no 15-second delay) upon activation of the fire protection system or sprinkler system, and upon loss of power. The capability of allowing immediate egress by a switch at the fire command center or other location may also be required.

Under normal operation, the delayed egress lock prevents egress until a force of 15 pounds, maximum, is applied for not more than 3 seconds; an audible alarm will sound in the vicinity of the door, and in 15 seconds the door will unlock to allow egress. After the device has been released by an attempt to exit, it must be rearmed manually - current codes do not allow delayed egress locks to rearm automatically.

Doors with delayed egress locks must also include signage stating, “PUSH UNTIL ALARM SOUNDS. DOOR CAN BE OPENED IN 15 SECONDS.” When a delayed egress lock is installed on an inswinging door, or when an AHJ approves a 30-second time delay, the signage must reflect the applicable operation. Specific requirements for the signage can be found in the model codes, and current codes also require the UL 294 listing for delayed egress locking systems.

The model codes include some additional limitations based on the use group or occupancy classification. For example, past editions of the IBC/IFC prohibited the use of delayed egress locks in assembly, educational, and high hazard occupancies, but the 2018 editions include exceptions for doors serving classrooms with an occupant load of less than 50 people, and for secondary exits from courtrooms. Delayed egress locks are allowed in those locations when the jurisdiction has adopted the 2018 edition of the model code, or when approve by the AHJ.

Controlled Egress: In health care facilities where patients require containment for their safety or security, doors may be locked in the direction of egress under normal operation but must allow emergency egress.

The IBC and IFC allow this application to be used in some health care units in hospitals, nursing homes, and other Group I-1 and I-2 facilities. These units might include memory care, maternity, pediatrics, or other areas approved by the AHJ. NFPA 101 includes these requirements in the chapters that cover new and existing health care facilities, and the code allows the doors to be locked where patients’ special needs require specialized protective measures for their safety or security.

According to the IBC and IFC, the building must have an automatic sprinkler system or automatic fire detection system, and activation of these systems must unlock the doors to allow egress. Loss of power must also automatically unlock the controlled egress doors, as well as a switch that directly breaks power to the lock - located at the fire command center, nurses station, or other approved location. A building occupant must not be required to pass through more than one door equipped with a controlled egress lock before entering an exit. The automatic-release requirements listed here do not apply to areas used for psychiatric treatment, or hospital units where listed infant abduction systems are installed.

All clinical staff members must have the ability – including keys or credentials – to unlock the doors for emergency egress, and these procedures must be included in the facility’s emergency plan. Training and drills are crucial in order for staff to be familiar with the egress protocols. Systems used for controlled egress must be listed to UL 294, and emergency lighting must be present at doors equipped with these locks. The requirements of NFPA 101 would not change the type of locks used in these systems (fail safe electrified locks), but the Life Safety Code does include slight variations to the required safety systems and procedures.

Stairwell Reentry: Stairway access doors may be locked on the stair side but must unlock to allow building occupants to leave the stairwell if it becomes compromised during a fire.

The IBC and IFC require all stairwell doors that are lockable on the stair side to have electrified locks that can be remotely released by a switch at the fire command center, or other approved location. (Note: Stair discharge doors may be locked to prevent access to the stairwell but must allow free egress.) For high-rise buildings, the IBC and IFC require the stairwell to be equipped with a two-way communication system if doors are electrically locked. Consult the IBC/IFC for exceptions related to buildings with a single exit stair.

The NFPA 101 requirements for stairwell reentry differ from the IBC and IFC, so it’s very important to refer to the adopted code to verify what is required. For example, NFPA 101 allows doors to be mechanically locked on the stair side when serving four stories or less – the IBC and IFC require these doors to be electrically locked, or never locked. NFPA 101 also exempts some occupancies from the reentry requirements, and includes a section detailing the criteria for “selected reentry” – which allows some doors to be mechanically locked and others to allow reentry.

If mag-locks are used on fire-rated stair doors, the door must be equipped with additional latching hardware to maintain the fire rating. In addition, the mag-locks must meet the applicable requirements on the egress side – sensor release, door hardware release, delayed egress, or controlled egress. Fail-safe electrified locks or fail-safe trim for fire exit hardware is commonly used; fail safe electric strikes are not listed for use on fire door assemblies.

Elevator Lobby Egress: Doors secure the elevator lobby and prevent access to the tenant space but must allow emergency egress from the lobby.

Currently, the IBC and IFC require each elevator lobby to have code-compliant egress via at least one exit. This could include direct access from the lobby to an exit stairwell, or free egress from the lobby to a corridor that leads through a tenant space to an exit. This means of egress must not be restricted, except with a delayed egress lock (most occupancy types) or an exit alarm.

NFPA 101 does allow egress through elevator lobby doors to be restricted during normal operation, if the doors allow emergency egress. The application must be allowed by the applicable occupancy chapter. For example, Chapter 11 (Special Structures and High-Rise Buildings) allows elevator lobby exit access doors to be locked “in other than newly constructed high-rise buildings.” Therefore, this application would not be allowed by NFPA 101 in new high-rise buildings.

The building must have a fire alarm and sprinkler system, and the lobby must have a smoke detection system. Activation of any of these systems (except by manual pull stations), or loss of power must automatically unlock the doors to allow egress. The doors must remain unlocked until the system is manually reset.

The elevator lobby must have a two-way communication system connected to a central control point that is constantly staffed by people who can provide emergency assistance. The electrified hardware must be listed to UL 294, and any latch-releasing hardware on the door must comply with the egress requirements of NFPA 101.

Because the IBC and IFC do not include a section similar to NFPA 101 regarding elevator lobby doors, some cities and states have modified the IBC/IFC to allow these doors to be electrically locked. These modifications typically require fail safe locks which unlock automatically upon activation of the fire protection system, as well as communication between the elevator lobby and a security desk or other location.

Security Interlock: Two or more doors are interlocked so that when one door is opened, the other door cannot be opened; commonly used on clean rooms and high-security applications.

Mag-locks are often used in security interlocks, but this application is not currently addressed in the model codes except when related to a prison sallyport. This type of system could impede egress, so each application must be approved by the AHJ, and additional safety features may be required. For example, to avoid entrapment in the room or vestibule, the AHJ may require emergency override switches in both locations, as well as an override switch on the exterior that is controlled by a key or credential. These switches will allow the doors to be unlocked for access or egress if one door is in the open position, preventing the use of the other door. In most security interlocks, the locks are automatically unlocked upon activation of the fire protection system, to allow free egress. Consult the AHJ to determine what is required.

In most cases, only one of these sections will apply to a particular door opening equipped with a mag-lock. The exception would be a stairwell door that must meet the stairwell reentry requirements on the stair side but would have one of the other applications on the egress side. Remember, refer to the applicable model codes and any state or city modifications to determine whether additional limitations apply, and consult the AHJ if more information is needed.

Code Comparisons - Occupancy Classifications

I-Codes. Until the 2018 edition of the IBC, delayed-egress locks were allowed in all use groups except A – assembly, E – educational and H – high hazard. Beginning with the 2018 edition, delayed-egress locks are allowed on the secondary exits that serve courtrooms (typically assembly occupancies) if the building has a sprinkler system. The 2018 edition also allows delayed-egress locks on classroom doors in educational occupancies if the calculated occupant load served by the door is fewer than 50 people. This gives schools an option if they’re looking for a way to prevent elopement of young children or students who have special needs.

NFPA. The NFPA codes are less restrictive and allow delayed-egress locks in areas of low and ordinary hazard contents, although the Life Safety Code includes restrictions depending on the occupancy. For example, delayed-egress locks aren’t permitted on the main entrance or exit doors that serve assembly occupancies, and they also are prohibited on airport jetway doors. Lodging or rooming houses can have only one door that has a delayed-egress lock per escape path, and residential board and care facilities are permitted to have delayed-egress locks only on exterior doors. The other occupancy classifications aren’t subject to similar limitations.

Code Comparisons - Required Fire Protection System

I-Codes & NFPA. Both sets of model codes require buildings that have delayed-egress locks to be equipped throughout with an automatic sprinkler system or approved automatic smoke- or heat-detection system. This requirement allows either type of system, although the change to the 2018 IBC that applies to courtrooms specifically requires a sprinkler system.

Code Comparisons - Activation Time

I-Codes & NFPA. Both sets of model codes require the delayed-egress timer to begin when a force of 15 pounds is applied for no more than 3 seconds. Prior to the 2015 edition of the IBC, the timer was required to begin after someone attempted to exit for 1 second. The activation time required to initiate the 15-second (or 30 second) timer is permitted to be less than 3 seconds, but it can’t be more than 3 seconds.

Code Comparisons - Automatic Release Delay

I-Codes & NFPA. When the timer is activated, the model codes require the delayed-egress lock to release in the direction of egress after 15 seconds; the AHJ might approve a time delay of 30 seconds. After that period, the door will be unlocked in the direction of egress, and another attempt to exit will allow the door to be opened.

Code Comparisons - Rearming After Activation

I-Codes & NFPA. When the timer of a delayed-egress lock is activated and the lock allows egress after 15 (or 30) seconds, the model codes require the lock to be rearmed manually.

Code Comparisons - Audible Alarm

I-Codes & NFPA. Both sets of model codes require an audible alarm to sound when a delayed-egress lock is activated, but the codes don’t mandate a specific type of alarm. Some products incorporate a continuous alarm, while others have an intermittent sound or even a verbal countdown.

Code Comparisons - Signage Requirements

I-Codes. Signage must state "PUSH [PULL] UNTIL ALARM SOUNDS. DOOR CAN BE OPENED IN 15 [30] SECONDS.” These signs are required for doors equipped with delayed-egress locks (see exception for Group I) and must be mounted above and within 12 inches of the door exit hardware. Beginning with the 2015 edition, signage is required to comply with the visual character requirements of ICC A117.1 – Accessible and Usable Buildings and Facilities. In Group I – institutional occupancies, the AHJ may allow signage to be omitted for certain types of treatment areas.

NFPA. The required text for the signage is the same as that required by the I-Codes: “PUSH [PULL] UNTIL ALARM SOUNDS. DOOR CAN BE OPENED IN 15 [30] SECONDS.” The NFPA codes require signage for delayed-egress locks to be readily visible, with letters not less than 1 inch high, a stroke width of one-eighths of an inch and a contrasting background, durable and located on the egress side of the door adjacent to the release device.

Code Comparisons - Action Upon Alarm Activation

I-Codes. When the fire alarm or sprinkler system is activated, delayed-egress locks must allow immediate egress automatically. This ensures that building occupants can exit quickly during a fire.

NFPA. The NFPA codes are more specific regarding the types of system activation that must unlock the delayed-egress locks for emergency egress. These doors must unlock with no delay in the direction of egress upon the activation of a sprinkler system, not more than one heat detector or not more than two smoke detectors.

Code Comparisons - Remote Release

I-Codes. To allow immediate egress when necessary, the I-Codes require delayed-egress locks to be capable of being deactivated by a switch at the fire command center or other approved locations.

NFPA. Remote release isn’t mandated by the section of the Life Safety Code that addresses delayed-egress locks.

Code Comparisons - Action Upon Power Failure

I-Codes & NFPA. When power fails, both sets of codes require delayed-egress locks to unlock immediately in the direction of egress. A common question about delayed-egress locking systems is whether battery backup is allowed in the power supply of the electrified hardware. The model codes don’t address this specifically, so it often is left up to the AHJ to decide whether delayed-egress locks must release upon loss of the main power to the building or continue to delay egress on standby power. However, based on the requirements of NFPA 72 – National Fire Alarm & Signaling Code, I don’t recommend using independent battery backup in the power supply of the delayed-egress lock. If the fire-alarm system and delayed-egress locks are powered by two different standby power systems, the hardware might not interface properly with the fire alarm after the loss of main building power. Using the same standby power source for the fire-alarm system and delayed-egress locks is preferred.

Code Comparisons - Emergency Lighting

I-Codes & NFPA. Emergency lighting is required by both sets of model codes, on the egress side of the door on which a delayed-egress lock has been installed. It’s important to check for the presence of emergency lighting before you install delayed-egress hardware.

Code Comparisons - Quantity of Locks per Egress Path

I-Codes. For most use groups, only one delayed-egress lock is allowed per egress path. This has changed from past editions of the I-Codes, where a building occupant could encounter only one delayed-egress lock before going through an exit. In Group I – institutional occupancies, such as hospitals, nursing homes and day care facilities, the I-Codes allow two doors that have delayed-egress locks per egress path, with a maximum combined delay of 30 seconds. In Group I-1, Condition 1 and Group I-4, the exception permitting two doors that have delayed-egress locks mandates that the building is equipped with a sprinkler system throughout.

NFPA. For most occupancy classifications, the NFPA codes don’t restrict the number of delayed-egress locks per egress path. Only in lodging or rooming houses does the Life Safety Code limit delayed-egress locks to one device per escape path.

Required Listings

I-Codes & NFPA. Both sets of model codes require delayed-egress locking systems to be listed to UL 294 – Standard for Access Control System Units. If a delayed-egress lock will be installed on a fire-door assembly, it also must be listed to UL 10C – Positive Pressure Fire Tests of Door Assemblies or NFPA 252 – Standard Methods of Fire Tests of Door Assemblies. In addition to the other listings, panic hardware that has delayed egress as a feature must be listed to UL 305 – Standard for Panic Hardware (I-Codes & NFPA) and in some cases BHMA A156.3 – Exit Devices (NFPA only).

If you are a system integrator or access automation installer or even a distributor, it is important to know how to select the best code application for access system on behalf of the customer. Majority of the datasheets and catalogues are not really useful unless you already know what you are getting into. If need any further information contact us on ssaintegrate@gmail.com.

Further Reading

For more on codes and delayed-egress locks:

IBC sections for Delayed Egress:

·        2021 – 1010.2.13

·        2018 – 1010.1.9.8

·        2015 – 1010.1.9.7

·        2012 – 1008.1.9.7

·        2009 – 1008.1.9.7

NFPA 101 sections for Delayed Egress Electrical Locking systems:

7.2.1.6.1

Use Backup Power For EM Locks

Use Backup Power For EM Locks 

Access control, one of the key components of a comprehensive security solution, comes in many different varieties. Essentially there are two components, the lock (i.e. the physical mechanism keeping the door locked) and the access control system (such as a card reader, biometric reader, keypad etc, which opens the lock).
Most locks can be set to function in one of the following ways:

Fail-safe: in the event of a loss of power supply, the lock will automatically unlock, ensuring that people can still exit through the door (safety first)

Fail-secure: in the event of a loss of power supply, the lock will automatically lock, meaning people are unable to enter (or exit) through the door (security first)

It therefore only takes a loss of power to make a fail-safe lock ineffective. Of course there can be a battery backup supply installed, but the battery will have a limited lifespan, perhaps not more than a couple of hours, which limits the time available for the power supply issue to be resolved. Fail-secure locks are therefore better for doors which require higher security, but carry greater risk for safety as there could be people trapped inside the building.

When the main power fails, many believe maglocks must leave doors unlocked.

However, battery backed up maglocks are allowed according to IBC / NFPA code. It just needs to be done properly. We examine the five critical steps for using backing up maglock power correctly:

·        Understanding Codes

·        Calculating Power Budgets

·        Factoring In Power Source

·        Connecting Power Supply Fire Alarm Loops

·        Including The AHJ

In this note, we look at what the code actually says about power backups for maglocks, where they might be illegal, and how to do it right when allowed.

Multiple Factors

When it comes to preventing your Electromagnetic locks (mag-locks) doors from being unsecured when power drops, there are three basic considerations to make:

·        Codes: Understanding the applicable codes and how they apply to a building's use of maglocks is the fundamental start.

·        Engineering: Translating those code requirements into a compliant design.

·        The AHJ: Getting approval from the relevant authority is the last, and maybe most critical aspect of the process.

Codes

Accounting for about 80% of the access control in use, mag-locks operate by an electromagnetic strip attached to the door frame which aligns with an armature attached to the door. The lock can be fail-safe (whereby the electromagnet releases the armature) or fail-secure (whereby the electromagnet attracts the armature) depending on the use and safety standards.

Surprising to many, national codes do not forbid the use of battery backed up maglocks, despite the dominant 'free egress must always be possible' theme. If codes indeed forbid battery backups, these exceptions are made at the local level. However, their use is allowed if done correctly. Take a look at these passages, covering the full scope of controlled openings regardless of occupancy code:

·        NFPA 101 (2012) 7.2.1.5.6 (Electrically Controlled Egress Door Assemblies)

·        NFPA 101 (2012) 7.2.1.6.2 (Access-Controlled Egress Door Assemblies)

·        NFPA 72 (2012) 21.9.1 Electrically Locked Doors

·        IBC 1008.1.9.9 (2012)

The fundamental relevant clause cited is:

Loss of power to the listed hardware must automatically unlock the door.

However, the clause does not prohibit the use of backup power. Any electric lock in the direction of egress shall be connected to the fire alarm system and unlock when the system is activated or when power is lost.

The local jurisdiction may have a variation of these 'model codes' that take exception to the rules, so maintaining local awareness of using maglocks or backup power to them is a crucial step, often undertaken when meeting the AHJ. (See the last section in this artical.)

Calculating Power Budgets

Knowing how long a battery will keep a maglock locked is crucial. Maglocks are typically high demand devices that can drain batteries rapidly as the current draw of maglock is continuous, unlike other lock types that only use power when unlocking.

Take this example 500 pound maglock that requires 320mA at 12 VDC or 170mA at 24VDC:

Assume a 12VDC backup system furnished with two 5 amp hour batteries that must keep four maglocked doors (two sets of double doors) energized. The locks alone consume over 1.25 amps per hour, so with a 10 amp supply, doors will fall unlocked in less than eight hours. As such, prolonged outages may still require manual security response, such as guard staff mechanically locking normally maglocked doors.

Calculating this demand is complicated by other devices that must also be powered in the access system, typically the controllers, readers, and even some RTE devices like PIR motion detectors. The total demand associated with the backup supply may quickly shave the backup power duration to mere minutes in a large system, and ample capacity is a matter of careful design.

Designing Battery Backup - Device / Door Priority

Part of designing a battery backup system may be prioritizing specific (perimeter) doors to stay locked, but leaving others (inside) unlocked when power drops. Of course, the decision must conform with facility security management plans, but in the interest of maximizing uptime for critical doors, others may need to be excluded.

Factoring In Controller Power Support

However, even if one specifies sufficient batteries, a door controller may not support passing sufficient power for the period desired for battery back up power.

Normally, the maglock will be powered by main power and power will be switched on/off by controller contacts.  However, in cases when main power fails or the access designer connects maglocks as field-powered devices, power may then supplied and routed through the controller itself. Flat out, many controller contacts are not designed or rated to deliver substantial amps for long periods.  

While card readers may draw modest amounts of power (ie: 35mA - 100mA), the controller's output relay contacts may not be rated to pass through sufficient amperage to power maglocks (ie: 125mA - 850mA+)

(Note: Later versions of eIDC32 do not include this output power limitation.)

It is because of this limitation, and the way that codes address 'direct interruption' of power to maglocks, that most maglocks are best installed using a separate linear power supply, not powered by pass-thru capacity in the controller.

Batteries vs UPS vs Generators

It is worth noting that batteries are not always the only, or even preferred method, of backup power. UPS devices or batteries, as noted in UPS Backup Power for Security Guide, are the most unitized and least expensive to deploy, but run duration is always a concern. As a result, especially in critical infrastructure or services facilities, the entire building may be backed up by a generator. In this case, the supply is generally much more substantial and runs into hundreds of amps per hour. In these situations, the run length of the backup system may simply not be a realistic problem.

Power Supply Fire Alarm Loops

The codes are clear on one engineering point: when the fire alarm activates, all power to maglock must drop. This typically is implemented by tying the linear power supply into the fire alarm via an input loop.  When the alarm is pulled, it sends a signal to the supply that it must cut power to whatever device is wired to it.

Most access panel and maglock manufacturers include these instructions, although they are typically vague on details in how to connect their components so that it happens.  In many cases, the install instructions state 'Installer must wire controller and/or power supply to stop issuing power when local fire alarm is activated', or similar. However, connection plans for doing this are not hard to accomplish if understood graphically. 

For example, take this Kisi access control knowledge base schematic that shows this common connection graphically: 

Power to the maglock is directly issued by a linear power supply, that in turn is triggered to drop power when a fire alarm is detected at the controller.  Alternatively, the power supply itself may include fire alarm input contacts instead of connecting to a door controller. As previously noted, however, this power drop may apply to every device connected to the supply: readers, controllers, RTE and more.

This may leave the door unsecured, and the main motivation of 'occupant safety' takes a clear precedence over 'building security'. Therefore, schematically planning out where each device is powered, and under what conditions backup power is supplied, should not be oversimplified.

Including The AHJ

Even after all this is done, the answer might still be "no".  If the local authority having jurisdiction, or AHJ, does not approve, the idea is dead. There are two basic reasons why local AHJs may not accept the idea:

·        First Responder Access: AHJs simply do not want any possibility that firefighters cannot enter a building because the door is locked.

·        System Malfunction: Alternatively, some AHJs refuse backed up maglocks because if the fire alarm interface malfunctions, the batteries could potentially keep the door locked and trap panicked occupants inside a dangerous building.

As a result, some areas outright forbid using backup power of these types of door locks as a matter of local exception and take any decision out of the hands of local inspectors.

Proceed Cautiously

These issues describe why maglocks are hated or deemed too difficult to work with by many. While using maglocks may be less expensive or easier to install that other types of electric locks, they are not always the best choice. If the opening design is too restrictive or costly to employ other lock types, then backup power must be supplied to keep doors locked.

Working through a code compliant design and getting approval of the AHJ become a priority for the new access system.

Before you make any decisions about what lock is best for your site, it's important to first think carefully about what your site requires in terms of safety and security, and to evaluate how risk can be reduced to ensure that security related incidents won’t interrupt your business operations.

Another key consideration is the state of the site itself: if you are adding access control to a site after its completion, it may be easier (and certainly more cost effective) to opt to use wireless locks as installing all the components and wires for mag-locks and electric strike locks will require a lot of additional time, labor and effort.

Some end-user opt for a combination of locks, installing a mag-lock and an electric strike lock on a single door to ensure that it is safe, secure and is able to accurately record movements of people in and out of the door at all times. However, in this case, it may just be simpler and more cost effective to install a wireless lock. 

If you still aren't sure what type of lock and access control system best meets your needs, feel free to get in touch with one of our experts via ssaintegrate@gmail.com. Before selecting vendor / installer check and verify they are authorized or not to execute your access control system.

Security Mantraps on the way

Security Mantraps on the way

Security mantraps came into use during the 16^th century and were mechanical devices used for catching poachers and trespassers. Today, a security mantrap is commonly described as a small room, area or compartment that is designed to temporarily hold (trap) an individual between two doors (barriers) so that their credentials can be verified before granting access. Verification may be manual, with security personnel doing the verification, or automatic, with technology doing the verification. Most systems installed today are automatic with various integrated technologies to enhance security, safety and prevent unauthorized entry.

In the 17^th century, sally ports were built to control the entryway to a fortification or prison. They often included two sets of doors (or gates) to delay enemy penetration. Today, a sally port used for security applications may include doors, gates or other physical barriers to control access of people (or vehicles) to a secure area. Both security mantraps and sally ports are in widely used for security applications, however, despite some similarities, the terms are not used interchangeably, and only sally ports are referenced in the building codes.

A mantrap is an access control tool designed and restricted to a physical space, which is separated from the adjoining spaces (rooms) by two doors, usually an exit and an entry door that cannot be unlocked at the same time. Mantraps are like a double-door checking system that use either airlock technology or interlocking doors.

Today's simplified automatic mantrap rooms enable access with access cards, key fobs and mobile phones. Since mantraps prevent two persons (unless authorized) to be in the same room, they can be used for shared spaces in hospitals, dormitories and boarding rooms or anywhere else where people have some need for privacy.

Both the International Building Code (IBC) and the Life Safety Code (NFPA 101) describe a sally port as a compartmented area with two or more doors (or gates) where the intended purpose is to prevent continuous and unobstructed passage by allowing the release of only one door at a time. Both codes restrict their use to institutional type occupancies (e.g., prisons, jails, detention and correctional centers) and require provisions for continuous and unobstructed travel through the sally port during an emergency egress condition.

During 2017, the most digital damage from cyber-attacks includes continuous targeting of critical infrastructure, ransomware, government emails being hacked, exfiltration of Central Intelligence Agency documents, and the multinational WannaCry ransomware attack of over 200,000 systems. Gartners’ global information security spending forecast estimates that by the end of 2017, purchases for security products and services could reach $84.5 billion or a seven percent increase since 2016. Defenses have progressively improved and measures continue to be implemented. However, there is one area which lags far behind – that is the physical security of data centers and, specifically, the adoption and employment of mantraps.

According to BICSI, a mantrap is created using two interlocking doors which open only one at a time after the correct credentials have been validated. To physically secure a facility or data center, periodic risk assessment and policy reviews should be conducted. Ideally, drills should be included to engrain the training scenarios and validate policies and procedures. An example of layered security can be found in the TIA-942 where tiers I through IV are used to differentiate each level including Kevlar or bullet resistant walls, windows, doors, closed circuit television (CCTV) monitoring, access control and more.

Despite their widespread use, security mantraps are not referenced by either IBC or NFPA, which has given rise to a plethora of terms and definitions, including, for example: security portals, security vestibules, security airlocks, security booths, security cabins, control vestibules and personnel interlocks. For the supplier, designer or code official, this lack of regulation can result in different interpretations of building code and life safety requirements. Generally, the most appropriate sections of the code are applied and enforced, which may include sections on doors, gates, turnstiles, revolving doors and accessibility requirements. Because security mantraps are unique in their design and operation, the enforcement of code sections intended for other technologies may result in installed systems that are over- or under-designed with added costs and project delays, if accepted at all.

A security mantrap may be manual or automatic, manned or unmanned, pre-engineered or built from the ground up, located indoors or outdoors, and include a variety of technologies to enhance security, safety, aesthetics, throughput, service and overall performance. The systems come in various sizes, shapes, styles and configurations with a multitude of finishes, glazing and door options, including ballistic and vandal resistant. Other options and features include: metal/weapons detection, left object detection, tailgating/piggybacking detection, monoblock construction, wall mount versions, network interface capabilities, video cameras, intercoms, anti-pass back integration, biometrics, manual releases, and inputs/outputs for control and alarm monitoring. most common mantraps work with a system of two interlocked doors, there are solutions that can be implemented on three or more doors, including varied authentication systems. “Real” mantraps typically have two locked doors. Some interlocked mantraps, such as those used at bank entrances, are unlocked to begin with, and only lock when one of the doors is open.

Security mantraps are commonly found in high-security, mission-critical facilities (e.g., government, military, critical infrastructure), but can also be found in many commercial and industrial facilities (e.g., banking, data centers, pharmaceutical, health care, airports, casinos, executive suites, high-end retail, R&D labs). Some of the key drivers for using security mantraps include the ability to detect and prevent tailgating and piggybacking incidents in unmanned locations, satisfying various regulatory compliance standards (e.g., GDPR, GLBA, PCI DSS, HIPPA, FISMA, SOX) by restricting access to critical information systems, and protecting against other security threats that have become more prevalent in the world today (e.g., espionage, terrorism, theft, vandalism, protests, etc.).

When security mantraps are being considered as a countermeasure to mitigate unauthorized entry, it is important to establish clear goals and objectives for the equipment, application and environment. Then, carefully review and evaluate the proposed system based on form, fit and function. When these systems become part of the building infrastructure, provisions for security and safety must be met. This often starts with a security risk assessment for the facility or site.

Two Major Types of Mantraps:

• Air Lock Control – low-security systems used only for environmental control also referred to as normally unlocked.
• Restricted Entry and Exit – these are considered the highest security type that is used with normally locked doors. Opening any door keeps all other doors secure. The man trap buffers simultaneous requests for access which prevents any two doors from being unlocked.

Additionally, some man traps may incorporate the use of Request-to-exit (REX) device – typically located on the inside secured door, most are identified as a ‘quick release’ latch.

Mantrap Pros:

• Allows only one person to enter or exit at a given time
• Requires proper identification and authentication
• Restricts movement into and out of the data center
• Can be used to closed unwanted visitors until authorities are called
• Provides an audit trail for personnel and visitors

Mantrap Cons:

• Highly secure doors are more expensive
• May not permit movement of large boxes, dollies, deliveries, etc.
• May fail during electrical power outage unless backup exists
• If not properly implemented according to policy and design, may present a safety risk

The goal of any security risk assessment is to develop a protection strategy that mitigates risk to people, property and information systems, and, for security mantraps, the primary goal is to prevent unauthorized entry. The security risk assessment process begins with asset identification and valuation, followed by evaluation and analysis of associated threats, vulnerabilities and potential loss impact. Finally, security measures are recommended and form the basis of an integrated protection strategy.